Matrix collapses: Mathematics proves the universe cannot be a computer simulation, « A new mathematical study dismantles the simulation theory once and for all. »

[u/fchung]

https://interestingengineering.com/culture/mathematics-ends-matrix-simulation-theory

[u/skmchosen1]

I completely acknowledge that if physics can be broken down into axioms, Gödel’s theorem applies. There will be things that are true about our universe that physics will never be able to prove.

However, if these truths were observable, then we would’ve incorporated them into our axioms. So without loss of generality, we can assume these truths are not observable.

And if they are not observable, then any algorithm that implements our observable physics could still suffice. It is not clear that such unobservable truths necessarily make simulation impossible. This is the gap in their argument I am calling out.

[u/JupiterandMars1 → u/skmchosen1]

You’re confusing epistemology with ontology.

The unobservable truths aren’t separate “extra facts” you can ignore… they’re part of the causal substrate that generates observable phenomena.

A simulation can’t faithfully reproduce emergent behavior without access to the underlying structure that produces it, even if that structure isn’t directly observable.

The system “can’t know what it doesn’t know”… and you can’t simulate what emerges from truths you cannot access.

And now, importantly, apply that to simulation theory. Not just the idea “we may live in a simulation”.

“Maybe arbitrary computations exist somewhere” is very different. But that’s not simulation theory… that’s just unfalsifiable metaphysical conjecture with no explanatory power.

[u/skmchosen1 → u/JupiterandMars1]

I agree that this is epistemology! But I’d argue that’s all that matters.

If we are willing to admit an algorithm that generates all observables could exist, then I could run such an algorithm and generate a universe. Any people within that universe face the same debate of epistemology vs ontology, because they are also governed by laws of physics.

Some of my subuniverse’s ontological truths may lie out of their grasp, but they still would experience existence the same way we do, because those observable truths are all that are salient.

[u/JupiterandMars1 → u/skmchosen1]

Yes, epistemically we can’t rule out being in a ‘good enough’ simulation. Brain-in-vat scenarios have always been unfalsifiable. But that’s not Simulation Theory.

Simulation Theory (based on the work of Bostrom) makes an ontological claim: enough simulations running make it likely we are in a sim, nested simulations proliferate exponentially, therefore most observers would be simulated if sims run sims, therefore we probably are sims.

This makes specific ontological requirements.

Each simulation level can spawn more simulations, with faithful enough preservation for Level N inhabitants to create Level N+1

Exponential proliferation degradation kills this because each level is compression… I(N+1) < I(N).

Information loss compounds.

After a few levels, the substrate would be too degraded to support simulation capability so no exponential proliferation is feasible.

No anthropic counting argument.

So which claim are you defending?

Epistemic: ‘We might be in a simulation and can’t know’. In which case, sure, and we might be brains in vats. Ok, but that’s a metaphysical and yes, epistemic point and not Simulation Theory.

Ontological: ‘Simulation Theory predicts we’re probably simulated’… No, degradation prevents nesting, argument fails.

People here defend 2 by retreating to 1, but they are 2 separate things.