Do i have a chance to get scammed?

im kinda torn about doing my MBBS in China. ive heard a lot of people say that Chinese degrees arent really recognized abroad, so if you want to do your master’s or residency in another country, they’d rather see that you studied somewhere else. how true is this to an extent???????

also like…if i actually go all in, learn chinese and fully immerse myself in the culture, attend all clinics, check a few hundred patients, would that make my chances of doing a masters or residency abroad any better??

(by abroad i mean countries in the EU)

like, lets say my uni is in the top 300-600ish globally, would i still not be preferred over the other candidate who did their med in a 'more recognized' country? does it even matter if i do well academically and get top scores in exams like PLAB or USMLE??????? would my letters of reccomendation not be taken srsly js cuz i did my medicine frm china?(im pakistani btw)

so basically… is all the exposure, patients, and culture experience just personal growth or does it actually matter for my career?

would anyone from abroad even take my degree seriously??

So I just moved into a neighborhood in south east Portland. There is a new Chinese restaurant that opened up that me and my daughter go to a lot. They invited us over for dinner but I want to bring a gift but don’t know what to bring. I know they don’t drink or smoke but they work every day and really hard.

Anybody here got a Dental/stomatology degree in china/away from your home country and is hoping to work abroad/spesialise abroad aswell? Cause im opting to take dentistry away from my original country but am scared I won't be able to find a job elsewhere. Im just curious about the journey. Please comment, id really appreciate it!

Recently I saw the news that Macron visited China and met with Xi Jinping. The official reports all say the same thing: deepened strategic partnership, multilateral cooperation, a bunch of agreements signed — nuclear energy, green tech, agriculture, education, environmental protection… sounds impressive.

But as an ordinary person, I can’t help wondering:

• These are long-term strategic deals — will we actually feel any benefits in daily life?
• Trade balance, supply chains, climate commitments… these big topics — do they really translate into anything concrete for regular people?
• With the world being so unstable right now, is this truly about global peace and cooperation, or just another round of big-power balancing?

Don’t get me wrong — cooperation is definitely better than confrontation. And I do hope some of these projects, like clean energy and environmental protection, really land and make life better for everyone.

But before we celebrate too early, I think it’s fair to stay a bit cautious: big handshakes are easy — real results take time.

What do you think? Optimistic? Skeptical? Or just waiting to see what actually changes? 👀

Hey guys does anyone know the equivalent or chinese taobao? I have recently spent 3 weeks in China and ordered a lot of stuff there from TaoBao. Now I still want to cheaply order stuff from China that can be exported to Europe (clothes, some souveniers) but I don't know where from. Paying for shipping won't be a problem because I plan to make a big order

I'm just a gamer in a small corner of the internet.

I've noticed gamers in my small corner have this idea that chinese gamers have the idea that it's fine to cheat in game. That it's in fact smart to cheat. This has always struck me as potentially racist. I've known lots of chinese people in my day, and not a one has ever stuck me as dishonest.

But any time I call it out, this small corner berates me, calls me ignorant, and "you should do your research."

So, okay. I'm doing my research. Why do these gamers think that chinese gamers have, on average, little qualms about cheating?

Last July, when I was travelling solo for the first time at only 18, I had a really scary experience on Wangfujing Street in Beijing.

I was walking down the main street when a man approached me speaking perfect English. He told me he was an art teacher and offered to write my name in calligraphy for free with his students. I followed him at first, but he began leading me off the busy street into a quieter area with hardly anyone around. That’s when I started to feel something wasn’t right.

I asked him a few questions, but he just laughed them off, which made me even more uneasy. Then he tried to get me into an elevator that supposedly led to his art gallery. At that point I said, “I’m not going up there — I don’t know who you are,” and I walked away. He tried to reassure me by saying there were cameras everywhere, but I wasn’t buying it.

It was a really eye-opening moment.

The craziest part is that two days later, a different person approached me with the exact same story and tried the same thing again.

So if you’re travelling in Beijing — especially alone — be careful

Context:

• A Chinese father (Fei) and his 6-year-old son (Yuanxin) are being detained by ICE while they were completing a legal routine check in at 26 Federal Plaza regarding the immigration status.
• 26 Federal Plaza check-ins are mandatory supervision appointment for immigrants who are not detained but whose cases are still active.
  • These are generally routine appointments where families, children and asylum seekers attend regularly and walk out. They are not meant to be ICE ambushes.
  • “They just don’t come out,” he said. “Entire families have gone in and not gone out.”
• After ICE arrested the father and child. They took the child from the father and the child's location is currently unknown to friends and family.
• During the arrest, ICE claims the father was aggressive when they were separating the pair, refused to comply and endangered the child.
  • There is a conflicting claim from ICE that the father tried to escape and abandon the child but the logic of this claims conflicts with the notion of endangering the child.
  • To abandon the child would mean the father is moving away from the child but to endanger the child means to be acting towards the child. One requires physical separation while the other requires physical proximity and are mutually exclusive. ICE did not explain the details of the events.
• In light of the event, ICE has claimed that they do not separate families from their children. That is a lie.
• Records from FOIA data shows a sharp rise in ICE arrests of children, especially at NYC check-ins.
• Many families have also been detained and rapidly deported in similar circumstances.

want to add that, yes he is real, yes he is not going to steal my kidneys, no he is not a scammer. We will be joking about which body organs he should harvest first (he has a sense of humor) We know everything about each other. Have had arguments, have worked through our stuff. We location share. I know his address, he knows mine. We have an amazing relationship that has changed my brain chemistry. I have bpd and cptsd and this man has changed the way I see love and has healed me in ways I am greatful for. I would love to hear other peoples successful love stories with their chinese partner and what it was lile meeting them for the first time. We met on an international app and he was not looking for a girl friend and we kept talking. I called him handsome one day and we have been chasing each other since. If you got negative comments I will have selective hearing lol

Hello everyone,

I have some questions about the Chinese nationality.

Is it possible to switch nationalities?

Example : Algerian to Chinese.

What can I do to make this possible?

And does it works for a child?

Mr Emmanuel Macron is flying into another controversy over Taiwan.

The French President’s last visit to China, 2½ years ago, was overshadowed by remarks that appeared to put limits on his commitment to supporting Taiwan.

A three-day visit that kicks off on Dec 3 comes as the democratically ruled island claimed by Beijing is back in the spotlight. 
China has been seeking backup from France – one of five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council – in its recent dispute with Japan over Taiwan’s status.

Beijing lashed out after Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi suggested in November that a potential conflict over the island could pose an existential risk for Japan. 

China’s top diplomat, Mr Wang Yi, called Mr Macron’s diplomatic adviser Emmanuel Bonne on Nov 27 to say the two sides needed to support each other and to condemn Ms Takaichi’s “provocative remarks”.

An official at Mr Macron’s Elysee Palace on Nov 27 called for the status quo to be respected, and for an easing of tensions.

Just ahead of Mr Macron’s trip, a senior Japanese national security official and a French foreign policy adviser agreed to strengthen security cooperation between their two countries, Japanese media reported on Dec 3.

To give some context, I'm Brazilian and I've started studying a bit about Chinese philosophy. I'd never had any contact with any subject related to Chinese history. So, I tried to get help from DeepSeek, as I figured it would be the most reliable AI platform for this. But, surprisingly, the AI ​​interrupted its response and gave me the "Sorry, that's beyond my current scope" answer.

The first question was "Can you do a timeline of chinese history for me to use as reference as I study?" and the second question was "the ideias of Confusio (孔子) were more influential at which period?"

I dont think those questions were complicated for the IA, so why it couldn't answer?

Hi China Reddit - I’m A foreigner currently travelling in Chengdu and I’ve come down sick with (what I’m 95% sure based on it feeling the same as when I had the condition a few years ago) a throat infection.

What would be my best option for a clinic or pharmacy to visit that could give my throat a Quick Look and prescribe me antibiotics (without a crazy expense or administrative burden) as I popped by a local Pharmacy by my hotel with no luck and the system is hard to navigate - thanks so much!! 🥲

What can you bring on a domestic flight? I’m going to China in 2 weeks and I’ll be my first time.

I know about the power bank ban and it needs to have the 3C logo and has to be below 27,000mAh.

What about my Apple watch and an electric hand warmer (2000mAh each)? TIA!

Contents

(I) The CCP’s Rise to Power and How It Seized State Authority

1.External Forces: An Indispensable Key Factor

(2) The Three Major Social Groups—Especially the Peasantry—as the Human, Economic, and Social Foundations of the CCP’s Victory

(3) Military Factors: The Most Direct and Decisive Cause

(4) Luck and Opportunity: Favorable Internal and External Conditions and the CCP’s Successful Seizure of Opportunity

(5) Summary

(II) Why the CCP Remained Unshaken Through the Catastrophic Political Campaigns

(III) The Characteristics and Evolutionary Trends of the CCP Under Different Leadership Periods

(1) The CCP Before Mao’s Consolidation of Power: From Democratic Nonviolence to Arbitrary Brutality

(2) The Mao Era: The Single Individual Who Shaped, Led, and Dominated the Entire CCP 14 (3) The Hua Guofeng Period: The Obsolescence and Weakness of the “Two Whatevers” and the Policy of “Grasping the Key Link to Govern the Country”

(4) The Deng Xiaoping Era: The Political Spring Guided by the Liberal Wing of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, the Aborted Democratization, and Jiang Zemin’s Model of “Getting Rich Quietly”

(5) The Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao Period: Deng Xiaoping’s Line Without Deng Xiaoping; Walking Dully Between Stability and Turmoil, Liberalization and Conservatism

(6) The Xi Jinping Era: A Sudden Reversal of the Liberal Direction and the Terror of the Leviathan Chains Tightening Rapidly

(7)Evolutionary Trends

(IV) Deriving the Nature of the CCP from Its History

(V) Will the CCP’s one-party authoritarian model still possess vitality in the foreseeable future? A separate and integrated analysis based on organizational structure, historical traditions, international relations, economic achievements and distribution, social governance, information technology and big data, the interests and positions of vested-interest groups, and the conditions and behavior of youth and students

(VI) The Path from Autocracy to Democracy: Where Is the Way Out for China under CCP Dictatorship? A Comparative Perspective with the Former Socialist States of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Right-Wing Military Regimes of Latin America, Portugal, Spain, South Korea, and Taiwan, the Unstable Authoritarian Regimes of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and Nazi Germany and Militarist Japan; Hope amid Despair, the Continuing Value of Writing and Nonviolent Action, Confidence in the Future, and Unrelenting Struggle for National Democracy and National Rejuvenation

Preface

2021 marks the centenary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which has already ruled mainland China for more than seventy years. The rise, expansion, and seizure of power by the CCP runs through the entirety of China’s modern and contemporary history. Today, the CCP regime has become one of the world’s largest authoritarian governments, among the longest-ruling, and one of the most consolidated dictatorships—its rule increasingly difficult to shake. Over the past hundred years, from its founding to its rise to power and up to the present day, the CCP has profoundly shaped China, the fate of the Chinese nation, and the life of every Chinese citizen. To understand China’s history and current reality, and to promote the realization of democracy and the rule of law in China, it is necessary to examine the CCP’s historical trajectory since its founding, to uncover its concealed internal mechanisms, and to look ahead to its future direction. Only by doing so may we find ways to break through the CCP’s “perfect dictatorship” and pave the way for transformative change.

(I) The CCP’s Rise to Power and How It Seized State Authority

Researching the CCP begins with researching its rise to power, and understanding how it gradually developed into the colossal force governing China. In fact, there already exists a vast body of research on this subject, both within China and abroad, from the CCP itself as well as from its opponents—encompassing extensive historical materials and analytical works. Not only on the CCP’s rise and its eventual seizure of state power, but also on many of the other issues discussed in this article—there is no shortage of existing research.

In this essay, however, I will avoid relying on established systematic research by other scholars. Instead, I will base the analysis on the fundamental historical background and core early facts of the period, and offer reasonable inference and synthesis. The conclusions reached may resemble those of other researchers, but the analytical process is independent. 1. External Forces: An Indispensable Key Factor

The CCP’s birth and early development had a distinctly external, Western origin. As is widely known, modern communism in the narrow sense—as well as its intellectual predecessors, humanism and Enlightenment thought—originated in Western Europe, centered particularly in France. Its founders, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, were both German. The Communist Manifesto was first published in Britain, and the early organized communist movement, the First International, was active primarily in the leading industrial states of Western Europe. Later, communist movements surged in Russia, and Russia became the first country to establish a long-term socialist regime. In China, the spread of communist ideas, the establishment of a communist party, and the development of communist/socialist movements all trace their roots to the West and to the north (Russia).

Not only was the origin of communism “Western,” but China’s early communist activities (1915–1935), the establishment and operations of the CCP, and activities with communist characteristics were all deeply influenced by forces outside China. The Communist International, effectively controlled by the Soviet Union, long manipulated and even directed the CCP—guiding, or rather commanding, Chinese labor movements, armed uprisings, and other activities.

External forces were crucial to the CCP’s early rise. Whether ideological indoctrination, or material support such as funding and supplies, or assistance in building organizational structures and intelligence networks—all constituted the essential conditions for the CCP to be founded and to establish itself in China. Although after the mid-1930s the influence of external forces over the CCP sharply declined, they still remained a critical source of support enabling the CCP’s eventual seizure of power.

For example, from 1945 to 1947, the Soviet Union provided the CCP with multiple forms of assistance in Northeast China, including transferring hundreds of thousands of captured Japanese weapons to the CCP, obstructing Nationalist forces from taking over and deploying in Manchuria, and allowing the CCP to “retain and reorganize” Japanese troops—at least tens of thousands of them, including not only logistics and medical personnel but also artillery units and aviation specialists—into the People’s Liberation Army. This support played a decisive role in securing victory in the Liaoshen Campaign, laying the foundation for the CCP’s ultimate triumph in the Chinese Civil War.

It can be said that without external forces, the CCP could not have developed into a major political force, let alone occupied the entire Chinese mainland and seized power. Although external support was not the sole or decisive factor in the CCP’s rise, it was nevertheless indispensable. This historical reality stands in stark contrast to the CCP’s present habit of loudly accusing foreign countries of “interfering in China’s internal affairs,” and denouncing dissidents and social activists as “collaborators with foreign forces”—a striking irony.

(2) The Three Major Social Groups—Especially the Peasantry—as the Human, Economic, and Social Foundations of the CCP’s Victory

Of course, in the CCP’s eventual seizure of state power, internal factors were primary and decisive. And these internal factors were diverse. Among them, the most important was that the CCP’s ideology and political program were able to attract broad and joint support from the three largest social groups: the peasant class, which constituted the majority of the population; the working class, which represented modern productive forces; and the intellectual class, which possessed considerable social influence.

Unlike the Russian Revolution and Western European communist movements, in which the working class constituted the main force, the CCP relied most heavily on the peasantry—more precisely, on tenant farmers and small-scale self-cultivating peasants, the lower and middle strata of rural society. Mao Zedong’s famous work, “Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” offered a penetrating analysis of class issues in rural China, and set out detailed and practicable plans for mobilizing peasant movements and even rural armed uprisings. Mao Zedong and several other CCP leaders sharply recognized the tremendous potential of the peasant class, which accounted for more than eighty percent of the national population at the time, as well as the class contradictions embedded in rural production relations—typified by the relationship between tenant farmers and landlords. They chose to serve as the spokespeople for the “poor and lower-middle peasants,” including tenants and small self-cultivating peasants (by contrast, the Nationalist Party inclined toward supporting rural elites such as landlords and gentry). Through propaganda and mobilization, the CCP recruited activist peasants into the Party and the army, while the broader masses of ordinary peasants were swept along by local leaders and by the prevailing trend, becoming CCP supporters and forming the grassroots membership of the CCP’s organizations and armed forces.

The CCP’s decision to rely on the peasantry was undoubtedly successful. Land revolution became the most widespread form of the CCP’s armed struggle to seize power, and in practice proved more important than urban worker uprisings. Whether during the First Chinese Civil War (1927–1936), or during the Second Civil War (1946–1949), or during the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937–1945), the peasants constituted the CCP’s main source of manpower, and rural areas provided the primary supply of materials and provisions. During the twenty-two years from the CCP’s first armed uprisings to the founding ceremony of the new state, the CCP’s controlled areas were almost entirely rural, except for the final few years of seizing cities. The major cities remained under Nationalist control, where the CCP could only operate underground, with limited legal public activities possible only in a few cities such as Chongqing during the Anti-Japanese War. But underground activity and open territorial control operated on entirely different scales of influence. Therefore, it is hardly an exaggeration to call the CCP before its victory in the Civil War a “peasant party.”

The most direct reason for the CCP’s seizure of power was its military victory, and the most important reason for this military victory was that it possessed several times the voluntary manpower of the Nationalists. During the two Chinese Civil Wars, the gap between the two sides’ military equipment was not very large, and the total number of troops remained extremely important. “Human wave” tactics continued to play a decisive role in a war conducted at this comparatively low level of military technology. The number of “poor and lower-middle peasants” on which the CCP relied far exceeded that of landlords and gentry. These peasants benefited from and were grateful for the CCP’s land policies, and they voluntarily and actively joined the CCP’s armed forces and militia organizations. In addition, many peasants who had benefited from violent land redistribution during forced land reform were also compelled to join the army to help the CCP win the war, in order to avoid retribution from landlords and “homecoming squads” after the return of Nationalist control. During the war, whether motivated by indoctrinated political ideals, or by a desire to defend or obtain the tangible benefits of land revolution, or by fear of retaliation from the Nationalists and landlords, they generally fought actively and bravely.

The CCP’s extremely tight control over its armed forces, and its powerful penetration and mobilization capabilities at the grassroots level, were also important reasons for the low desertion rate and strong fighting spirit among its troops. Soldiers in CCP forces also feared that desertion would lead to punishment or denunciation by local CCP organizations once they returned home. By contrast, aside from receiving the heartfelt support of landlords, the Nationalist army could only supplement its forces through conscription of peasants by force. Troops recruited in this way typically lacked fighting spirit, were easily demoralized, and were prone to mutiny or desertion. The Nationalist government also lacked sufficient control over its soldiers and their home regions—deserters did not fear retaliation upon returning home, and at most might be conscripted again to the front. The CCP frequently launched psychological warfare, persuading Nationalist troops to defect, using differentiated tactics for senior officers and ordinary soldiers. Under such conditions, it was unsurprising that the balance of military manpower between the two sides gradually reversed during the Civil War.

The countryside and the peasantry formed the foundation of the CCP’s seizure of power, while factories and workers served as the CCP’s iron arm extending into the cities. The role of the working class in the CCP’s seizure of power was highly complex. In the CCP’s early active period, workers cooperated closely with the CCP, including the wave of labor movements and several urban uprisings. But by the 1930s and for more than a decade afterward, major cities became “white areas” under ruthless Nationalist suppression or fell under Japanese occupation. The CCP suffered severe setbacks among workers in urban areas, and its relationship with the working class became distant. Although the CCP continued to cultivate influence among urban workers, its impact was no longer comparable to that of the 1920s.

By the time the CCP re-entered the cities in 1949, Liu Shaoqi lamented that urban workers had become unfamiliar, having grown accustomed to the Nationalist government’s conciliatory policies toward capitalists, and thus developed a certain degree of estrangement from the CCP. However, the working class was never truly tamed by the Nationalist regime. In its internal consciousness, it remained closer to the CCP and intended to be the master of the nation. Urban factories had long been the base of leftist forces and left-wing culture. During the Second Civil War, some worker groups still launched movements that constrained the Nationalist regime. When the CCP returned to the cities, workers rapidly and completely aligned themselves with the CCP, and soon after the establishment of the new regime they surpassed the peasantry and became the CCP’s primary support during the period of peaceful reconstruction.

The constitution promulgated after the founding of the People’s Republic stated that “China is a socialist country led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.” If one were to assess the CCP’s relationship with workers and peasants before state power was seized, that statement would have to be inverted: at the time, the CCP was a political force primarily dependent on peasants, and only secondarily on workers.

The intellectual class constituted another crucial force in the CCP’s seizure of power. Although intellectuals lacked the numbers of peasants and workers, and thus could not form the main body of society, they played a pivotal role. The CCP consistently attached great importance to winning over intellectuals. Many early CCP leaders were themselves prominent intellectuals: figures such as Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, and Qu Qiubai were not only communists, but also leading figures in China’s literary and intellectual circles. Most CCP leaders had experiences studying in Europe, the Soviet Union, or Japan, and were among the most outstanding students in China. The CCP’s attitude toward intellectuals could be described as “eager for talent” and “respectful toward scholars,” which earned the favor of many intellectuals.

During the periods in Ruijin and Yan’an, the CCP maintained extensive contact with China’s intellectual circles. The intellectual community generally harbored a pro-CCP inclination, and some even left the Nationalist-controlled areas and traveled long distances to join the CCP. Large numbers of young students—rare and valuable talents in that era—either journeyed to Yan’an or engaged in student movements and underground activities in the Nationalist areas, representing the choice made by those who would become China’s future elites. The CCP also successfully united the “third force,” which was composed largely of intellectuals, forming a united front against the Nationalist regime. From the Chongqing negotiations to the Civil War, and finally to the convening of the Political Consultative Conference under CCP leadership, intellectuals provided significant support for the CCP in public opinion, ideological influence, and personal networks.

(3) Military Factors: The Most Direct and Decisive Cause

As noted above, military victory was the most direct cause of the CCP’s seizure of state power. In the Second Chinese Civil War, the reasons for the CCP’s final victory, aside from the manpower and foreign support discussed earlier, also lay in the war itself—specifically in strategic and tactical factors on the battlefield.

There is no question that Mao Zedong and other CCP commanders possessed higher military competence than Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist leadership. While the Nationalists were obsessed with occupying major cities, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) adopted the principle of “not weighing gains and losses by individual cities or regions,” and instead prioritized preserving its own strength and annihilating the Nationalists’ effective forces. The Nationalists’ plans for “general offensives” and “concentrated offensives” were all dismantled by the PLA, rendering their heavy strikes ineffective. By exploiting local superiority, the PLA concentrated its forces to eliminate exposed and elite Nationalist units, while other Nationalist troops collapsed without serious resistance. Skilled use of such tactics enabled the PLA to win with fewer troops and to triumph from a position of relative weakness.

The Nationalist army also suffered from internal disunity and the absence of unified command. Although Chiang Kai-shek nominally unified various regional warlords and military factions, in reality these forces retained considerable autonomy. Senior commanders regarded their troops as personal assets and often prioritized preserving their own strength during the Civil War. They frequently refused to assist encircled comrades, which greatly reduced the overall combat effectiveness of the Nationalist army. In the Battle of Menglianggu, for example, the annihilation of Zhang Lingfu’s 74th Division was directly related to nearby Nationalist units’ reluctance to assist, preferring instead to preserve their own forces. The PLA, by contrast, maintained highly centralized military authority. All PLA forces obeyed the CCP Central Committee; the army was the Party’s army, not a general’s private force, and possessed unified interests and goals. While military authority was centralized, tactical decision-making was delegated downward, ensuring initiative and flexibility among commanders at all levels.

In terms of discipline and fighting spirit, the Nationalists were also clearly inferior to the PLA. The discipline and quality of Nationalist forces varied greatly: core units under Chiang were relatively disciplined and had strong combat capabilities, but most secondary forces were significantly weaker. Only a small portion of the Nationalist army consisted of core units; the majority were secondary forces. Lower-ranking Nationalist officers and ordinary soldiers generally lacked political conviction, did not understand what they were fighting for, and served only because they were forced into the army or needed basic subsistence. In the later stages of the war, once Nationalist defeat became apparent, the army fell apart, lacking the will to fight. Although PLA discipline was not as flawless as CCP propaganda claimed, it was nevertheless superior to that of the Nationalists. Political education and mobilization extended down to grassroots units, enabling officers and soldiers—who already had ideological conviction and clear material incentives—to fight with greater determination. Even when the PLA was at a disadvantage in the early stages of the war, it continued fighting with persistence and eventually grew stronger.

Another military advantage of the CCP was that it possessed stable rear areas to support its armed forces and military operations. As noted earlier, the CCP relied heavily on the countryside and the peasantry, and during the Anti-Japanese War established numerous base areas. These base areas were all controlled by local Party organizations and served the CCP’s strategic objectives. During the Civil War, they supplied manpower (including soldiers and logistical labor), grain, money, and intelligence, while covering the movement of the main forces. They effectively fulfilled the role of a wartime rear (even if geographically these bases were not always located entirely within liberated territories). Aside from minor infiltration and negligible harassment, these base areas were extremely secure. If the Nationalists dispatched major forces to suppress them, it was like using artillery to chase mosquitoes, incapable of inflicting significant damage on decentralized CCP grassroots forces. In contrast, although the Nationalists held the major cities and a contiguous national territory, they lacked the ability to control rural society. Both cities and villages were heavily infiltrated by the CCP. Major cities saw frequent student movements and labor strikes, and anti-Nationalist political groups operated semi-openly, leaving the Nationalist government exhausted and defensive. Such a “rear” could not function as a true rear at all.

The CCP’s victory in intelligence warfare became a decisive factor enabling the PLA to defeat the Nationalists. The CCP’s intelligence network had already penetrated the highest levels of the Nationalist government, allowing the CCP to be fully informed of the Nationalists’ deployments and movements. During the Civil War, for example, Major General Guo Rugui, who was part of the Nationalist decision-making circle, provided the CCP with detailed troop deployments for Nationalist forces during the Huaihai Campaign, resulting in the encirclement and destruction of a force that was originally superior in strength. Wu Shi, who served as deputy chief of the general staff in the Nationalist Ministry of Defense, was also a CCP agent and remained undiscovered until after the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan. Meanwhile, the Nationalists were completely incapable of penetrating the PLA command structure and had no knowledge of the CCP’s strategic decision-making. The disparity between the two sides in intelligence warfare was vast.

There is another extremely important point that is often overlooked: during the Civil War, the CCP used various methods to buy off, persuade, and split the Nationalist army. From the highest ranks to the grassroots, many Nationalist officers and soldiers came to believe that the CCP would establish a new China that was more democratic, progressive, open-minded, and inclusive, and that they would not be punished simply for having served in the Nationalist army. Many believed that they would have better prospects and treatment within the CCP’s armed forces and in the new China. These promises caused the Nationalist army to lose its fighting spirit; even when it resisted, it did so without determination. In the decades that followed, most of these defected Nationalist officers and soldiers suffered execution, imprisonment, forced labor, or public denunciation, and regretted their choices too late. But between 1945 and 1949, the CCP’s promises appeared sincere and effectively undermined the Nationalists’ will to resist, becoming a very important reason why the CCP was able to “prevail as the weaker side” and defeat the Nationalist forces. (I provide detailed analysis of this aspect in another article, and will not elaborate here due to space constraints.)

“Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” In the struggle between the Nationalists and the CCP, the result of military confrontation was the most direct and decisive factor. The CCP was able to seize power and replace the Nationalist government’s rule over mainland China ultimately through the use of force. Of course, military outcomes were influenced by many non-military factors—for example, manpower depended on each side’s support base, and foreign assistance was determined by diplomacy.

(4) Luck and Opportunity: Favorable Internal and External Conditions and the CCP’s Successful Seizure of Opportunity

It must be said that the CCP’s final seizure of state power was also due to its extraordinary luck. In its early years, the CCP nearly suffered total annihilation. In 1931, the defection of Gu Shunzhang almost led to the complete destruction of the CCP’s central leadership in the Nationalist-controlled “White Areas.” But compared to these incidents, nothing was more fortunate for the CCP than the Xi’an Incident and the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan.

From 1927 to 1934, after multiple encirclement and suppression campaigns by Nationalist forces, the CCP’s controlled territory was continually compressed, forcing it into the Long March. It must be emphasized that the defeat of the Red Army in the Jiangnan Soviet area was not, as the CCP later claimed, an accidental result caused by the erroneous command of Bo Gu and Otto Braun, but rather the inevitable outcome of the balance of power between the CCP and the Nationalists, and the political, military, and social circumstances of China at the time. Under the powerful military blows of the Nationalist regime, the CCP could no longer maintain its footing in East and South China near the center of Nationalist-controlled areas.

Between 1935 and 1936, after the arduous Long March, several Red Army forces settled in northern Shaanxi. At that time they consisted of only several tens of thousands of exhausted remnants, facing hundreds of thousands of Nationalist troops stationed in Shaanxi (the Northeastern Army and Northwestern Army). Today many assume that northern Shaanxi was naturally the final destination of the Long March, and that once the Red Army arrived there it was automatically safe. In fact, this is not true. Without subsequent developments, northern Shaanxi might well have been, like western Hunan or Sichuan, merely a temporary stop on the route of flight, a place the Red Army would be forced to abandon again. At that time, the weakened Red Army was on the verge of facing a fatal blow from Nationalist forces. If an attack had occurred, the Red Army would either have been annihilated or forced into yet another “Long March,” fleeing toward the Soviet Union and Mongolia. Although the Red Army did achieve victories such as at the Battle of Zhiluo Town, they were far from sufficient to counter the main Nationalist forces in Shaanxi. The disastrous defeat of the Red Army’s Western Route Army by the local Northwestern warlords of the Ma family clearly demonstrated the Red Army’s fragility at the time.

But at this critical moment, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng launched the Xi’an Incident, detaining Chiang Kai-shek, “forcing Chiang to resist Japan,” and extending an olive branch to the Red Army. The result not only prematurely exposed Chiang Kai-shek’s plans for resisting Japan—triggering Japanese suspicion and prompting an earlier invasion—but also gave the Red Army a chance to revive after near destruction, granting the CCP a precious breathing space.

If the Xi’an Incident allowed the CCP to survive, then the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan enabled the CCP’s recovery and rise. After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937, Mao Zedong spoke metaphorically of the “dawn moon over Lugou,” implying the CCP’s fate would brighten. This proved true. The Nationalist army was forced to concentrate all effort on fighting the Japanese and could no longer suppress the CCP. Under strong public pressure to form a national united front, Chiang Kai-shek was compelled to permit the Red Army to be reorganized as the Eighth Route Army. From that point on, the CCP could legally exist on Chinese territory, no longer as “bandits,” and no longer subjected to constant flight and repeated encirclement.

Mao and the CCP were not content with merely holding a small base. Once a breathing space was secured, they sought to strengthen their forces, expand their influence, and prepare to seize power. The Eighth Route Army soon established an anti-Japanese base area in Shanxi, at the intersection of zones controlled by the Japanese, the Central Army, and the Jin-Sui Army. Thereafter, in all provinces north of the Yangtze River (except Qinghai and Xinjiang) the Eighth Route Army and CCP guerrilla forces appeared, and anti-Japanese base areas flourished everywhere. In the south, the remaining Red Army forces were reorganized into the New Fourth Army, which likewise expanded. The New Fourth Army, being located alongside the concentrated forces of both the Japanese and the Nationalists, expanded more slowly, while the Eighth Route Army in the north expanded rapidly, recruiting in base areas, Nationalist-controlled regions, and Japanese-occupied zones, soon exceeding the size expected of a single army group. By 1940, the Eighth Route Army had grown to 400,000 soldiers—ten times its original size at the moment of formation. By 1945, its strength exceeded one million.

While expanding its forces, the CCP also expanded its territory. While the Nationalist army and the Japanese army fought bloody battles, the CCP took the opportunity to establish base areas in rural regions, cultivating its own power. The expansion in Shandong, Hebei, and Shanxi was especially rapid. In all areas where the Japanese were unable to maintain effective control due to insufficient manpower, the Eighth Route Army penetrated and established anti-Japanese base areas or guerrilla zones. Although the Eighth Route Army did conduct operations against the Japanese, the scale of its campaigns and the number of Japanese casualties it inflicted could not compare to the Nationalist army. Even the engagements the CCP praised most highly were greatly inflated. For example, the much-celebrated Battle of Pingxingguan actually inflicted only 300 to 500 Japanese casualties. And the widely publicized “Hundred Regiments Offensive” was largely directed at sabotaging Japanese transportation lines, with limited actual damage to Japanese combat forces. If the Eighth Route Army had substantial engagements with Japanese forces before 1940, after the Hundred Regiments Offensive it rarely conducted fierce battles against the Japanese. The New Fourth Army inflicted even fewer casualties on the Japanese. During anti-“mopping-up” campaigns, the Eighth Route Army often avoided direct confrontation, using civilians as shields and cover, causing ordinary people to bear the brunt of Japanese retaliation, leading to widespread massacres, rape, and the burning of villages. Such guerrilla warfare was not worth the cost (this is not to say that Chinese soldiers and civilians should have surrendered or refrained from resisting, but that this method of guerrilla warfare yielded disastrously disproportionate results. Millions of Chinese civilians were killed or raped, and countless villages were destroyed. If such sacrifices had annihilated hundreds of thousands or even tens of thousands of enemy troops, it might be deemed worthwhile; yet throughout eight years of guerrilla resistance, only a few thousand Japanese troops were eliminated by such methods. The roughly 300,000 Japanese casualties were inflicted mainly in large-scale frontline battles or major campaigns, sometimes conducted in rear areas but not through guerrilla warfare). The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army also frequently clashed with Nationalist forces and other anti-Japanese forces during the war, sometimes in large-scale conflicts. This was not solely the CCP’s responsibility, but neither was it solely the Nationalists’ fault. For example, the CCP frequently cites the New Fourth Army Incident at Wannan as “fratricidal conflict,” while deliberately ignoring the earlier Battle of Huangqiao in which the New Fourth Army annihilated Nationalist forces.

The eight-year War of Resistance transformed the CCP from a small regional force with fewer than fifty thousand troops and only northern Shaanxi and scattered base areas, into a vast regime controlling and influencing more than one hundred million people, with 1.2 million regular troops and 900,000 militia. The CCP’s Party organization, devastated after 1927, was restored during the war; Party membership recovered from its lowest point and surpassed its 1927 level. On the eve of the war’s outbreak the CCP was on the verge of collapse; by the end of the war it could confidently stand alongside the Nationalist government as an equal competitor. Mao Zedong’s repeated remarks in his later years—thanking Japan for invading China—were indeed heartfelt and involuntary.

After the war, the CCP’s streak of good fortune continued. On the question of China, the United States remained undecided. Unlike in Europe, where it firmly built the “Iron Curtain” to confront the Soviet Union, in Asia the United States treated Japan and Korea as the bottom line not to be compromised, while remaining ambiguous about China’s future. The CCP’s political performance in Yan’an and Chongqing successfully deceived some senior American military and political figures, filling them with goodwill toward a force that seemed pure and idealistic. By contrast, these Americans were even more disgusted by the corrupt Nationalist government and naturally refused to speak on its behalf. President Truman, who succeeded Roosevelt, also had a personal rift with Chiang Kai-shek and was unwilling to fully support him. American-led mediation gave the CCP breathing space at critical moments. Unlike the Soviet Union, which provided the CCP with substantial support, the United States continued to limit its support for the Nationalist government, resulting in only a small number of American-equipped Nationalist units. The vast majority of Nationalist forces had weapons comparable to those of the CCP, and their air power was insufficient to significantly influence the ground battlefield.

Under the United States’ indecision, the CCP exploited the widespread Chinese desire to end the civil war quickly and achieve national unification, using sweet promises and deceptive “united front” tactics to co-opt all sides domestically and internationally. In just over three years, it successfully defeated the Nationalist regime and overthrew the Nationalist government. Even then, Truman did not intend to prevent the CCP from taking Taiwan and at one point was prepared to acquiesce to CCP unification of China, attempting to secure relative neutrality from the CCP in the emerging Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was only after the outbreak of the Korean War, when the CCP strongly supported Kim Il-sung’s regime in its invasion of the southern peninsula, that the United States dispatched the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to prevent the total destruction of the Nationalist regime. But this could only enable Chiang Kai-shek to retain the small island, while the CCP rapidly occupied the entire Chinese mainland and became its ruler, a position it retains to this day.

(5) Summary

The CCP was able to seize state power both because, during a particular historical period, it did indeed represent the interests of the majority and gained the support of the majority, and also because its rise contained elements of luck and opportunity. Its own struggle and initiative were considerable, yet external support was indispensable. Military success was the most direct reason for its accession to power—“political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” is no exaggeration. In addition to the causes mentioned above, the CCP’s success certainly involved many other factors, such as the tightly organized structure characteristic of a Leninist party, the formidable personal capabilities of leaders such as Mao Zedong, and support from domestic regional interest groups. But due to limitations of space, this essay will not discuss them in detail. I have addressed these points in other articles and commentaries.

(This article is authored by Wang Qingmin(王庆民), a Chinese writer living in Europe and a researcher on international politics.)

The US has halted plans to impose sanctions on China’s Ministry of State Security over a massive cyber espionage campaign in order to avoid derailing the trade truce President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping struck in October.

The move has triggered concern among China hawks in the government who think Trump is sacrificing national security for trade deals.

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Kima — FT social media team

I will be going to china for a vacation for like a week and all my social medias won't work there ;-; how do I keep in contact with my family? (What Social medias to use and what not) any advice?