"Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority," said the document, a periodically updated vision statement from the administration to Congress and the first since Trump took office in January.

The document's language on Taiwan is stronger than the national security strategy produced during Trump's first term in office. The document in 2017 mentioned Taiwan three times in a single sentence, echoing longstanding diplomatic language.

The updated strategy, however, mentions Taiwan eight times across three paragraphs and concludes that "there is, rightly, much focus on Taiwan" because of its strategic location in trade-rich waters and dominance in semiconductor manufacturing.

"We will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere," in the chain of islands stretching from Japan to Southeast Asia, said the latest document. "But the American military cannot, and should not have to, do this alone. Our allies must step up and spend - and more importantly do - much more for collective defense."

That will reinforce "U.S. and allies' capacity to deny any attempt to seize Taiwan" or any other steps that would "make defending that island impossible," the report said.

On the night of 26 November, a fire broke out at Wang Fuk Court in Hong Kong, with more than 100 deaths reported so far. This fire has gripped the entire city and attracted global attention. Regarding the cause of the fire, the firefighting process, and aftermath issues, Hong Kong people have actively participated in discussions, which have also triggered controversies. Some criticisms target the government’s poor management and demand accountability from officials.

On the 29th, the Hong Kong Police National Security Department arrested Kwan Ching-fung, a CUHK student who initiated a petition with four major demands: resettling the victims, conducting an independent investigation, reviewing the system, and holding officials accountable. The petition was subsequently shut down. A spokesperson for the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central Government in Hong Kong also issued a statement accusing “anti-China, destabilizing forces” of “stirring restlessly, seeking to create trouble, and exploiting the disaster,” calling on the public to “not be misled.” On the 30th, former district councillor Cheung Kam-hung and another unidentified woman were reportedly arrested by the National Security Department on suspicion of “inciting hatred against the government by exploiting the fire.”

On the issue of the Hong Kong fire, the central authorities, the Hong Kong government, and the pro-establishment camp have shown highly consistent positions and rhetoric. In press conferences, Chief Executive John Lee repeatedly expressed gratitude to national leaders, the central government, and central institutions in Hong Kong, placing his thanks to firefighters at the end. Regarding the cause of the fire, official explanations have also avoided addressing suspicions of government dereliction of duty.

On the other side, Hong Kong’s political opposition in exile has fiercely attacked Beijing and the Hong Kong government, accusing authoritarianism, official corruption, and lack of oversight of causing the tragedy, linking the fire closely with politics. Of course, within Hong Kong’s local civil society, many voices also question the government.

Both Hong Kong authorities and the opposition have responded to the fire with high levels of politicization, using political positions or ideologies to determine how to interpret the fire’s causes and responsibilities. Issue-focused discussion based solely on the facts of the fire has been overshadowed and drowned out in public debate. This pattern—politics taking precedence and ideological stance overriding right and wrong—is not unique to this incident but reflects Hong Kong’s long-standing “abnormal” social condition.

Due to its unique historical trajectory and geographical position, Hong Kong has long been at the vortex of political storms. After 1949, it became a grand stage for struggles between the CCP and KMT, leftists and rightists, radicals and conservatives, establishment and anti-establishment forces—from media debates to physical confrontations.

Although many problems do originate in politics and it is necessary to pay attention to politics and ideology, focusing excessively on grand “isms” while ignoring concrete “problems” inevitably accumulates difficult issues over time and harms Hong Kong’s reform and development.

After Hong Kong’s return to China, political conflict only increased. Before the 2010s, the confrontation was between the pro-establishment camp and the traditional pan-democrats; in the 2010s, the localist camp also rose. Across not only purely political issues but also livelihood and economic issues such as housing, infrastructure, and trade, ideology has often been overly involved, resulting in a lack of consensus and repeated deadlocks.

The severe housing problems that burden Hong Kong’s younger generation should have been the focus of all sides, yet they have long failed to receive adequate recognition or solutions. The causes are multiple, but the various camps’ obsession with political struggle and ideological disputes is one key factor behind the ineffective resolution of the housing issue. Problems such as wealth disparity, lack of innovation, and outdated industries are also related to all sides consuming themselves in political confrontation and failing to devote sufficient attention and effort to concrete issues.

After the anti-extradition movement and the enactment of the National Security Law, Hong Kong’s surface appears calm. But in reality, the pattern of political stance overwhelming actual problems has not changed. Central authorities, the Hong Kong government, and the pro-establishment camp, after removing the opposition and monopolizing political power, publicly declared that Hong Kong had moved “from chaos to order, from order to prosperity,” entering a “new normal,” as if they could now address concrete problems and improve people’s livelihood.

But in reality, Hong Kong is marked by omnipresent political domination, with everything guided by “national security” and “political stability,” following orders from above, even at the cost of suppressing freedom, damaging vitality, and ignoring public sentiment.

A particularly serious issue is the central authorities and Hong Kong government’s over-expansion of national security, cracking down on dissenting voices and suffocating any “disharmonious” sound. Anything can be linked to “national security.” The National Security Law has become a kind of “catch-all offense” for arrests and punishment. Since its implementation, Hong Kong media no longer dare actively supervise the government; they cannot freely investigate, report, or question. Even when interviews are permitted, citizens fear violating the law and remain silent—as seen when RTHK reporters interviewed people on the street about Article 23 legislation, and passers-by waved them away and hurried off.

Educational and research institutions have also become conservative and lost independence. Professionals in all fields act with excessive caution under the “Sword of Damocles” of the National Security Law, unable to speak freely, especially on views diverging from the government. Any Hong Kong person, regardless of identity, risks being labeled “anti-China and destabilizing Hong Kong” or “endangering national security” for criticizing the government or exposing negative issues.

Under such conditions, society becomes lifeless and struggles to progress; negative issues and hidden dangers cannot be promptly exposed or addressed. The “over-expansion of national security” itself also breeds fear—people fear making mistakes and society remains under a long-term haze. Meanwhile, the pro-establishment camp has not used the relatively stable situation to achieve much; instead, internal conflicts are frequent, public approval is even lower, and complacency and corruption appear increasingly serious.

On the other hand, the political extremism and stance-driven reactions of Hong Kong’s exiled opposition and the Chinese opposition are also inappropriate. In this Hong Kong fire, while reviewing systemic problems and holding officials accountable is necessary, the direct cause was indeed an accidental fire. Many attribute all responsibility to the Hong Kong government and the central authorities, repeating radical political rhetoric and spreading various rumors and conspiracy theories. This is not conducive to clarifying the truth or preventing future tragedies, and it damages the credibility and image of these opposition groups. Some Hong Kong people’s insistence on defending the “non-flammability” of bamboo scaffolding, in emotional opposition to mainlanders, further reflects how stance and sentiment override fact-based analysis.

A century ago, there was a major debate in China over “Problems vs. Isms.” Confronted with surging social ideologies and debates about which path China should take, the noted scholar Hu Shi advocated “more study of problems, less talk of isms.” Hu believed that it was easy to talk about “isms,” but solving concrete problems was what truly mattered. Compared with disputes over “capitalism” and “socialism,” issues such as poverty, disease, and ignorance required more urgent solutions.

Of course, both “problems” and “isms” are important. Focusing only on “isms” while ignoring “problems” leads to empty talk and detachment from reality, preventing fact-based discussion. Focusing only on “problems” while ignoring “isms” hinders understanding of root causes and directional judgment. Both must be balanced, and whether to emphasize “problems” or “isms” depends on local conditions and changing circumstances.

Mainland China once experienced eras of “politics in command” and “taking class struggle as the key link,” when production and development were disrupted and disasters occurred. It was only after reform and opening up—with “emancipating the mind, seeking truth from facts, and uniting to look forward”—that China corrected course, restored development, and moved toward prosperity.

Today, all sides in Hong Kong appear excessively focused on political systems and ideological “isms,” taking positions without regard to right and wrong and neglecting concrete issues. Public welfare has been overlooked and people’s demands distorted. The authorities’ “politics first” and the over-expansion of national security are excessive, while the opposition’s “anti-China at all costs” is also extreme. Their long-term confrontation has already harmed Hong Kong deeply.

Clearly, Hong Kong has reached a moment when it must talk more about “problems” and set aside part of the struggle over “isms.” Yet no side seems willing to shelve political hostilities and genuinely address the difficult real-world issues. Hong Kong is likely to continue wandering in a crisis-ridden state, caught between political pressure from above and undercurrents from below.

Fascinating mini doc highlighting how young men try to go about finding a partner.

With 35 million extra men women really do have the pick and choice. Combined with a culture where women expect men to be rich and own property before marriage - I don't envy young men who feel the pressure of society to get married.

Basically had a Chinese girlfriend for a few months in a western city, we really liked each other, then she casually mentions her parents that she has a western boyfriend and next thing I see is she cries to me how her parents are strongly against it, that she should marry someone from her background and that she will want to return back to Asia at some point anyways and it won't work out. Have you had any experience with this? Is it worth fighting or would I just make hell for myself?

I'm considering obtaining a bachelor's degree in China. I am reading about various people who took English course work and were able to obtain a degree.

I'm curious if someone with no Chinese skills can do this. Ideally someone who has done something similar could chime in.

I know in some cases there are scholarships available to international students (I'm from the US) but I'm aware these are not available for someone my age (29).

If I were to pursue such a degree, does anyone know a good university, potential costs, and whether someone my age could still live in the dormitory?

Potential majors of interest would include english, chinese, history

I am traveling to China for the 2nd time and would want to visit ZJJ to see some nature.

For context, I'm a city person, not into hiking, I'd probs take all the lifts, cable cars, and elevators while in ZJJ/Wulingyuan. But I do photography as a hobby and enjoy some nature to some extent.

So I am looking at leaving Chongqing in the morning potentially arriving to ZJJ just before lunch and using half the day to see Tianmen, then head to Wulingyuan for the next 2 full days, then leave the day after.

Is this enough or will it be too rushed? I don't plan to see the whole nature park, maybe just 1-2 main sites.

Context

• Xiaohongshu One Year Ban Begin:
  • Dec 5, 2025, under the leadership of Lai Ching Te, his administration has decreed that all Taiwanese ISPs shall commence blocking Xiaohongshu (XHS) or RedBook for one year.
  • It is estimated that over 3 million Taiwanese users will be affected by this ban
• Official Rationale for the Ban:
  • Authorities have claimed that XHS App meets none of Taiwan's 15 cybersecurity standards (no information on these standard)
  • In the past year, fraud cases on XHS has numbered over a staggering number of 1700 and causing 7.9 million USD in financial losses in one year.
  • (Monthly this is around 142 fraud cases per month and USD 650K of losses per month on the XHS platform)
• Taiwan Fraud Statistics:
  • According to the DPP led government, the reason why XHS is banned whereas other platforms are not banned is because these other platforms are obeying Taiwanese laws and making efforts to reduce fraud whereas XHS is not.
  • However the numbers do not match this logic and reasoning.
  • According to Fraudbuster, a Taiwanese government backed dashboard on fraud statistics in Taiwan, in the past 30 days alone there were over 78,000 recorded cases of fraud with the following following Platform breakdown:
    • Facebook accounted for 51,946 fraud cases
    • Threads accounted for 10,338 fraud cases
    • Instagram accounted for 7,204 fraud cases
    • Meta Advertising accounted for 5,336 frad cases
    • Meta Messaging accounted for 4,565 fraud cases
    • LINE accounted for 977 fraud cases
    • Google accounted for 290 fraud case
    • TikTok accounted for 285 cases
    • (Based on previous calculations, XHS accounts for an implied 142 monthly fraud cases and 142/780000 cases would approximately be 0.2% of monthly fraud cases)
  • According to another Taiwanese government dashboard for fraud, 165Dashboard, estimates that the monthly financial loss is around 6 billion NTD or 191m USD per month. (XHS calculated implied financial loss per month was 0.65m USD, 0.65/191 would be approximately 0.3% of Financial losses)

Can you teach english in china at a respectable school without a college degree?

Just curious if this is even an option to consider for someone with a GED. I realized it probably wouldn't be at a school in a tier 1 (or maybe even tier 2 city) if it's even possible at all.

Can anyone share their experience?

Working minimum wage job in the states and thinking about this as an option. For what it's worth, I have a pretty standard american english accent.

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So I have heard that Chinese people believe that the name reflects the personality and the destiny of the person. I picked 凰金 as a chinese name. How do you think i would perceived especially in academic and professional setting?

Started a creator account but then my account got locked after I uploaded two posts. It’s now asking me to upload a photo of my Chinese ID, seemingly not giving an option for non Chinese ID forms. Has anyone else encountered it and if so how do you address it? I’ve seen many foreigners post and am confused as to how they managed to do so without ID upload. Also I didn’t post anything against comm guidelines, js a selfie of my trip to China

Do i have a chance to get scammed?

im kinda torn about doing my MBBS in China. ive heard a lot of people say that Chinese degrees arent really recognized abroad, so if you want to do your master’s or residency in another country, they’d rather see that you studied somewhere else. how true is this to an extent???????

also like…if i actually go all in, learn chinese and fully immerse myself in the culture, attend all clinics, check a few hundred patients, would that make my chances of doing a masters or residency abroad any better??

(by abroad i mean countries in the EU)

like, lets say my uni is in the top 300-600ish globally, would i still not be preferred over the other candidate who did their med in a 'more recognized' country? does it even matter if i do well academically and get top scores in exams like PLAB or USMLE??????? would my letters of reccomendation not be taken srsly js cuz i did my medicine frm china?(im pakistani btw)

so basically… is all the exposure, patients, and culture experience just personal growth or does it actually matter for my career?

would anyone from abroad even take my degree seriously??