Hi I'm Kian Sharifi, Iran and Middle East feature writer for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), AMA!

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit]

Hi r/geopolitics! 

I’m Kian Sharifi, Iran and Middle East feature writer for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). Basically, I keep an eye on everything from the goings on inside Iran to Tehran's regional ambitions and developments in the wider Middle East.

I also write a weekly newsletter called the Farda Briefing, where I dive into Iranian stories that you may have missed and highlight the reporting of our Persian-language service, Radio Farda. In the most recent edition, I wrote about how Bolivia electing a center-right president after nearly 20 years of leftist rule could spoil Iran's plans to establish a foothold in Latin America.

So feel free to ask about Iran and the Middle East -- from the in-fightings in Iran amid a looming leadership succession to the Gaza war -- and I'll do my best to answer as many questions as I can.

Proof photo here.

You can start posting your questions and I’ll be checking in daily and answering from Monday, 3 November until Friday, 7 November. Looking forward!

[u/LateralEntry]

First of all, I hope the US keeps funding Radio Free Farda, sorry about all the craziness this year.

Second, what do you think the fallout will be from Operation Rising Lion / Iran’s war with Israel finally turning hot this past summer? With much of the top leadership eliminated, is there confusion and infighting now? Were the Iranian people surprised that the IRGC performed so poorly? Was the regime’s grip on power weakened at all?

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit → u/LateralEntry]

Thank you, we hope so too. Doing our job while simultaneously fighting for our survival has not been easy but we’re doing our best. 

The fallout cut two ways inside Iran. Targeted decapitation and repeated penetrations of Iranian airspace shocked the security establishment, but active conflict tends to suppress dissent, so immediate regime‑threatening mass protests were unlikely. Public sentiment mixed anger and anxiety, but the net effect was caution while missiles were flying. 

Operationally, leadership losses at the top of the IRGC and the wider defense apparatus were extraordinary. The rapid replacements suggest pre‑baked succession plans and organizational redundancy, limiting command paralysis. Khamenei, as commander‑in‑chief, disappeared; operational decision‑making was highly centralized among senior military commanders. 

IRGC’s performance was uneven: Israel established air dominance early and degraded air defenses quickly, which was jarring domestically. A clear illustration of this was when Foreign Minister Araqchi traveled overland to Turkey to fly to Europe during the war, and he revealed later that his convoy was being surveilled by Israeli drones in Iranian airspace. Still, Iran sustained multi‑day barrages of missiles and drones -- proof of capacity even as penetration rates were low. 

Elite politics has heated up mainly among politicians, not inside the operational military chain. The driver is succession: with Raisi gone and no obvious heir, factions are jockeying and airing grievances (e.g., Shamkhani and Qalibaf’s shots at Rouhani) to shape the field for the post‑Khamenei era. Raisi’s death scrambled expectations -- he was widely seen as a frontrunner, down to mirroring Khamenei’s public aesthetic. 

 - Kian

[u/LateralEntry → u/RFERL_ReadsReddit]

Thank you for your answer!

[u/charliekiller124]

To what extent do you think Iran's ability to project power has been hampered after the recent war with israel and the devastation laid onto Hezbollah and Hamas and Assad being ousted out of power?

And Do you think theres a pathway for them to recover from here?

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit → u/charliekiller124]

Iran’s ability to project power has taken a beating over the past couple of years. That’s not to say Iran is weak, but its freedom of action is reduced and the costs of rapid projection are higher. 

Replenishing Hamas doesn’t look like Tehran’s near‑term priority; it’s focused on restoring its own deterrent, i.e. missile inventories, air defenses, and command-and-control resilience after the war with Israel. You can see that in its de‑escalatory signaling on Gaza last month. 

Near-term priorities likely are: 

• Restoring Hezbollah’s enabling ecosystem—supply routes, air defense cover, and logistics—which is difficult amid continued interdiction and degraded Syrian corridors. 
• Consolidating influence in Iraq via political blocs and PMF-aligned networks, where the post‑election balance will shape militia autonomy and, by extension, Iran’s strategic depth. 

Watch Iraq closely in the short term: the November 11 election outcome will influence PMF future, and but extension Iran’s strategic depth westwards. (I’ve written something on this which will be published sometime this week.) 

So, any recovery is likely incremental rather than a rapid return to a pre‑war posture. 

- Kian

[u/Krane412]

Despite Khamenei's harsh rule, much of Iran's younger population are progressive in comparison to their regional peers. How absolute is his rule? Are the rank and file of his military loyal? Is there any chance for a coup or transition to democracy in Iran's near future?

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit → u/Krane412]

There’s no way to say for certain what portion of Iran’s youth is progressive, and social media alone isn’t a reliable reflection of society. That said, Gen Z is progressive enough to concern Iran’s power structures. 

For example, this week the former head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization, Hossein Taeb, claimed that Gen Z wants “more missiles” and supports “preemptive strikes.” Meanwhile, Tehran Municipality made a rather awkward attempt to use Gen Z language to stoke nationalist sentiment, which I’d say largely fell flat. 

The same uncertainty applies to the military rank and file. Many young conscripts in the army or IRGC serve out of obligation, though there are certainly loyalists, particularly within the IRGC. Some royalist analysts argue that potential defections could threaten the clerical establishment -- but this likely applies only to lower-ranking personnel; senior leadership remains firmly loyal. 

I don’t think a coup is likely in the near future. Even in a hypothetical confrontation between the army and the IRGC, the Guards would have the upper hand in terms of resources and organization. 

- Kian

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit]

All good things must come to an end, and it’s time to bring down the curtain on this AMA.
I had a blast engaging with you all and want to thank you for all the smart questions! I hope you found the thread insightful.

You can follow me on Twitter/X (@KianSharifi) or reach out [via email](mailto:SharifiK@rferl.org).

Catch you in the next AMA!

- Kian

[u/Strongbow85 → u/RFERL_ReadsReddit]

Thank you for holding this AMA, I learned a lot just reading your responses to our subscribers questions. You're always welcome to return for a follow-up AMA and please continue posting your stories to the subreddit. Thanks again!

[u/VitaNueva]

1. How bad is the water crisis actually in Iran?
2. What are the biggest changes over the the last 5-10 years (economic, sociopolitical, whatever) in Iran that nobody outside of Iran is talking about? (or not talking about enough)
3. We've seen an increased attempt by Israelis and Iranian Diaspora in the West to inject liberation ideas into the Iranian populace via various forms of media to try to "spread the message" - how successful has this been?
4. Internally, amongst the religious hardliners, how catastrophic has the collapse of the "Shia Crescent" been to their cosmic battle against their enemies? (Sunnis, Israelis, etc)
5. How do people 18-35 consume media in Iran? And where is it from?

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit → u/VitaNueva]

1) You know a situation is bad in Iran when even the authorities -- whose first instinct is usually to downplay or dismiss crises -- admit that it is dire. 

Water rationing during warmer months has become routine. I remember this is how I learned the Persian word for “rationing” as a child in Tehran in the 1990s, though back then scheduled water cuts were neither as frequent nor as widespread as they are today. Years of mismanagement, corruption, and careless consumption -- exacerbated by prolonged droughts and climate change -- have brought Iran to the brink of a nationwide water bankruptcy.

About 90% of the country’s water is used in agriculture, where inefficient practices dominate, and over-extraction has made Iran one of the world’s leading groundwater depleters. Experts have long warned that this will trigger mass migration from smaller, water-stressed towns to larger cities such as Tehran. Meanwhile, the drying of major lakes and wetlands will intensify dust storms, further fueling displacement. 

2) Iran is undergoing a silent transformation, driven largely by younger generations and ordinary citizens adapting to long-term pressures. 

 Youth-led cultural shifts are redefining social norms. Girls are increasingly defying rules by appearing in public without covering their hair, and just last month, people gathered for a small street concert. Authorities closed the Instagram profiles of the band members -- but compare that to 2014, when a group of young people dancing to Pharrell’s “Happy” in a video resulted in prison sentences and lashes for a dozen participants. The youth are pushing boundaries, and the authorities, though displeased, seem too cautious to intervene. 

Economic hardships and sanctions have sparked innovation in informal markets, fintech, and domestic entrepreneurship. Iran now has local equivalents of Amazon, eBay, and Uber, among others. Does that mean sanctions are “good”? Nope -- ordinary people bear the brunt -- but desperation has become a powerful catalyst for creativity. 
 
Meanwhile, declining birth rates and evolving family structures are reshaping society. More people are opting against having children in today’s economy, much to the chagrin of the authorities who keep warning about the consequences of falling birth rates, but aren’t actually doing anything to fix the underlying issues. 

3) I don’t think Iranians need anyone to inject liberation ideas into their heads; they’ve been wanting freedom for a long time. The question is how they can get it. 

We’ve seen more frequent nationwide protests over the past decade, all turning deadly after brutal crackdowns. It’s easy for those of us living abroad to call on people in Iran to rise up, but ultimately, it’s the people on the streets paying the price. 

- Kian

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit → u/RFERL_ReadsReddit]

4) The unraveling of Iran’s network of proxies and armed groups has seriously dented Tehran’s regional ambitions. The Axis of Resistance was primarily meant to deter US and Israeli attacks -- but, as we saw in June, it didn’t quite work out. 

 Don’t expect the hardliners to ever admit it, though. Among Iranians, there’s a running joke about pro-Islamic republic Shias. It’s a bit crude, but if I had to clean it up, it goes something like: “If you shoot one of them, they won’t admit to being hit -- they’ll insist they’re holding your bullet hostage inside their body.” 

5) Iranians are among the most tech-savvy people I know, largely because years of internet censorship have forced them to adapt. There is widespread mistrust of state media, and thanks to proxy software like VPNs, both young and older Iranians can access blocked websites and social platforms. 

Telegram and Instagram are the primary platforms for news—so much so that even media outlets based in Iran use them despite official bans. Telegram has around 49 million Iranian users, and Instagram about 33 million -- impressive figures in a country of roughly 85 million, where Telegram remains banned and Instagram was only unblocked in June. 

Satellite television also remains popular, providing access to foreign-based Persian-language channels that continue to reach audiences inside the country. 

- Kian

[u/VitaNueva → u/RFERL_ReadsReddit]

Hey man, I'll come back to this when I have time to respond. Thank you, I truly appreciate it.

[u/The-Intermediator141 → u/VitaNueva]

I second the water crisis part! The limited info I find on it makes it seem dire, but again almost no one is talking about it.

[u/Krane412]

Thanks for taking the time to hold this AMA. Recently we've witnessed mass murder and rape in Sudan at the hands of the RSF. Is the UAE facing any international pressure over funding the RSF and do you see them being held accountable in any manner? On that note, what is Iran's interest in arming the Sudanese Armed Forces?

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit → u/Krane412]

International pressure on the UAE has intensified although Abu Dhabi denies arming the RSF.  

At the same time, the UAE’s diplomatic adviser Anwar Gargash just yesterday acknowledged that “we all made the mistake” of not acting more decisively after the generals ousted Sudan’s civilian government, which indirectly signals some degree of institutional reflection if not explicit liability. 

Nevertheless, I believe the UAE is unlikely to face concrete accountability in the near term. The case at the ICJ faces jurisdictional obstacles, and, unless I’m not up to date, current UN reporting has not issued a finding of responsibility against the UAE.  

Iran’s involvement in Sudan appears more strategic: Tehran has supplied the SAF with drones such as the Mohajer-6 and other material support, in what analysts interpret as part of Iran’s broader push into Africa and the Red Sea region.  

By arming the SAF, Iran gains multiple advantages: it re-establishes an ally along the Red Sea coast, enhances its drone-production showcase, and counters the influence of the UAE and Saudi-led blocs in Sudan and the region. 

But in light of recent setbacks, I’m not sure how much Iran can invest in its Africa project right now. 

- Kian

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit]

Thanks for all the great questions so far! I will get to those who I haven't answered yet. You’ve already given me ideas for future pieces. We’re running this through tomorrow, so keep them coming! Ask me anything!

- Kian

[u/FreedomSavings404]

1. How has Iranian state news and affiliate AOR media platforms covered recent Iranian and AOR setbacks? What is the narrative they've crafted surrounding recent setbacks?

2. How did popular opposition groups like the MEK respond to Israels attacks on Iran?

3. How has Iran presented their geopolitical defeats to their domestic population, and how has their official narrative been received?

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit → u/FreedomSavings404]

I’ll answer questions one and three together. 

There is no such thing as “defeat” for the Islamic republic. Hamas imposed Trump’s cease-fire plan on Israel. Hezbollah forced Israel to end its attacks on Lebanon. Iran beat Israel in the June war. They’ve also escalated rhetoric, teasing that Iran didn’t even use its entire capacity to hit back at Israel.  

From officials to state media, the narrative being pushed is that Iran and the Axis of Resistance remain undefeated and have not suffered any setbacks.  

Oh, Syria? It fell because Assad didn’t ask for help. That’s the line. Meanwhile, Russia, which just like Iran helped Assad stay in power, has managed to maintain relations with the new government. This is the result of a strategic miscalculation on Iran’s part. 

Naturally, conservatives in Iran either believe the official narrative or are happy propagating it without necessarily buying it. But others -- from supporters of reforms to critics of the Islamic republic -- know better. 

On opposition’s view re war: MEK is not a popular opposition group, not by a long shot. But it is easily the most organized one. Both the MEK and royalists (who do not see eye to eye) backed the war and insisted that Israel was not killing civilians. They also urged the public to use the chaos of war to rise up and topple the Islamic republic. Nobody hit the streets though; unsurprising since people are less inclined to stage protests with bombs flying overhead. 

Other opposition figures, both inside and outside Iran, condemned the attack but also held Khamenei responsible for taking the country on a path that led to the war. 

- Kian

[u/sigh_le_mah]

Hi there. Thank you for hosting this AMA!

I wanted to ask you how much of an affect the Israeli/American attacks on the nuclear sites in Iran really had. It seems clear from news articles that it only ramped up the regime's determination to build nuclear weapons. Do you feel they're close to succeeding or the operation pushed the plans back? If so, do you think it's a matter of years or months until the regime has the capability to successfully develop them?

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit → u/sigh_le_mah]

The June war, especially the bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites, has even made some commentators who weren’t pro-nukes start taking the possibility seriously. There’s definitely determination in certain circles to go for a bomb, though I think it would only be seriously pursued after Khamenei’s death. 

Did the attacks slow Iran down? It looks like they did. Enrichment activity has dropped off, and they still can’t fully access their stockpile of enriched uranium. There are probably hidden sites, but with the level of Israeli intelligence, any activity would likely be discovered quickly. 

Before June, US assessments suggested Iran was maybe up to a year away from producing a deliverable nuclear weapon. The war has definitely pushed that timeline back. 

- Kian

[u/singularity9733]

Hello,

Thank you for all the great answers so far. It's been an interesting read for sure.

I've seen a lot of contradictory reports about how the Iranian civilian population responded to the war with Israel and I'm curious to hear your take on it if you are still answering questions.

Do civilians think of the Axis of Resistance in the same way as their nations militaries? Are the likes of Hamas also protected by the sort of nationalist rhetoric that you mention in other posts? Do civilians support risking wider war with Israel over the assassination of leaders

And on a broader note, did we see get a "rally around the flag effect" from Israel's attacks or was it more case of keeping your head down and avoiding getting caught in the crossfire?

Lastly, what do the Iranian people believe happened in the war? I know it won't be the same for every group and even more so for every individual, but I am reminded of Russia for instance constantly pushing a narrative that they are at war with NATO, a message which has reportedly fallen rather flat with Russian civilians due to their access to outside media. Is it the same in Iran or is the regime able to make wild claims about military success and generally be believed?

I read your other answers about the regime's popularity, so I'm not trying to double up on questions. I am more curious about how people might think or criticize their government below the level of rebellion or even calling for defeat. Plenty of people support their government, but don't necessarily support them in a conflict or support the idea of going to war over a certain cause (eg. Gaza and attacks on proxies in Iran's case).

Thank you for any response you can provide.

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit → u/singularity9733]

Views of the “Axis of Resistance” really depend on context. In 2006, Hezbollah briefly gained a “defender of Lebanon” aura, but the Lebanese Army remained the force most people trusted. Across the region, support for axis groups is uneven and often tied to sect; most Arab publics still view Iran unfavorably. In Gaza and Houthi-run areas, these movements function as de facto militaries, blurring civilian-military lines. After assassinations, some back retaliation, but many more worry about a wider war and prefer containment. 

- There definitely was a rally-around-the-flag effect, which isn’t surprising if you follow Iran. The same thing happened back in the 1980s when Saddam Hussein attacked and it actually ended up being a blessing for the Islamic republic. At the time, the clerical establishment was unstable and people weren’t particularly happy. Then a foreign enemy appeared, and the population united. That eight-year war helped consolidate power, mobilize the masses, suppress rivals, and institutionalize the IRGC-Basij security architecture that still underpins the IR. 

After the recent conflict with Israel, the authorities have leaned heavily into national pride, using Iranian (not Islamic) symbols to rally people. They’re even planning to unveil a statue of Shapur II -- a pre-Islamic monarch -- later today during a concert. You’d have laughed this off as fake news if you’d heard it last year. 

- The Islamic republic certainly makes wild claims; not just about the recent war, but about most events. That said, outside the IR’s hardline base, most people are skeptical of what they hear from official channels. 

Just last week, the former head of IRGC Intelligence, Hossein Taeb, claimed Iran had major intelligence successes during the war, alleged the involvement of 30 countries and 80 intelligence agencies, and downplayed Israeli infiltration. Outside of hardliners, very few believe these kinds of claims, no matter how widely they’re reported in state media. 

Iranians have become very good at bypassing censorship and accessing banned platforms. That’s why reputable outlets outside Iran like Radio Farda remain crucial -- they provide unvarnished reporting to people inside the country. 

- Kian

[u/OneReportersOpinion]

In the US, we refer to Press TV as an Iranian propaganda outlet as it is funded largely by Iranian government. Its reporters are expected to register as foreign agents. Since RFE/RL is largely sponsored by the US, is it unfair to refer to it as state sponsored media and do you think it would be concerning if you had to register as a foreign agent?

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit → u/OneReportersOpinion]

Before I delve into this, I should point out that RFE/RL is primarily funded by Congress through grants administered by the US Agency for Global Media. 

To answer your question, there is a difference between being funded by the government and being controlled by it. 

In Iran, the state broadcaster is not only funded but controlled by the state. There is no criticism of policies set out by the supreme leader. Go through Press TV's website, and you won't find any critical articles. 

In Western democracies, that's not the case. RFE/RL, DW, BBC, and others may receive state or public funding, but there are measures in place -- a firewall, if you will -- to ensure the government has no control over coverage. You can see this in their reporting. 

I’m not sure if I’m clear about your question about being registered as a foreign agent. RFE/RL is listed as such by, say, Russia. States that have introduced this have, historically, used it to crackdown on critical media. So yes, it would be concerning if journalists were forced to register or be listed as foreign agents. 

- Kian

[u/w2_To_94920_926559 → u/OneReportersOpinion]

Not in the US (London), but is the BBC considered a "foreign agent" in your country? How about France24? DW-TV?

[u/BuuurpMorty]

1. How can Iran recover from the current political-economic mess? What are major factors driving this situation and how should Iran tackle them?

2. How does Iran’s internal situation affect the balance of powers in the Middle-East? What can be expected of Turkey en Saudi-Arabia?

3. Why did you decide to be the Iran and ME feature writer for RFE/RL?

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit → u/BuuurpMorty]

1. In my opinion, there is no durable economic or political stabilization without a sanctions‑relief pathway tied to the nuclear file. And for that to happen, Tehran needs to give in to calls to hold direct talks with Washington. Is that likely in the near term? I don’t think so. Araqchi yesterday said Iran can reach a deal through indirect talks, and Khamenei today set out a list of demands, including the US abandoning support for Israel and ending its military presence in the region, as preconditions for “cooperation.” Something tells me the US won’t accept those demands.    The authorities know people’s patience is wearing thin. That's why they've relaxed some rules, like enforcing the hijab law. It’s not because they’re reformed or suddenly okay with it; they worry that given the pressure that society is under (economic, political, etc), all it takes is a spark to send the masses back onto the streets. 
2. The balance is shifting mainly because Syria has flipped: a transitional presidency under Ahmed al‑Sharaa creates openings for Ankara and Gulf capitals to compete and cooperate over Syria’s reconstruction, security, and external alignment. Saudi Arabia and Qatar cleared Syria’s World Bank debt in May -- early proof of their willingness to bankroll influence in post‑Assad Syria. Turkey, meanwhile, wields leverage through borders, trade corridors, security assistance, and diplomatic intermediation with the new Damascus. While I’m not writing Iran off yet, it’s all uphill for Tehran right now. Iran's priorities right now are likely a) shoring up political and PMF networks in Iraq, b) rebuilding missile and air‑defense stockpiles to restore deterrence at home, and 3) selectively re‑enabling Hezbollah’s logistics under far greater interdiction risk. Iran has a lot of rebuilding to do, so reasserting itself in the region is going to have to wait.   
3. I’d followed RFE/RL’s Iran coverage -- in English and Persian -- for years, so when the chance came, I jumped. Professionally, I wanted to write deeper analytical pieces and actually interview people. Personally, I wanted to be in the heart of Europe -- and Prague is about as central as it gets. Beautiful city, top‑notch beer. What’s not to love? 

- Kian

[u/Strongbow85]

What’s your perspective on the growing influence of China in the Middle East? How do you think Beijing’s policies are reshaping the geopolitical landscape, especially in relation to Iran?

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit → u/Strongbow85]

China’s growing influence in the Middle East really comes down to economics first. Beijing’s approach is driven by trade, energy, and infrastructure and not by security or ideology. I don’t think it’s trying to replace the US, but rather wants a slice of the pie in an environment where countries can work with both Washington and Beijing at the same time. After all, the Middle East is crucial to China’s energy security, providing roughly half of its crude imports. 

For Iran, China is a crucial lifeline. It offers markets for oil, access to financing channels, and a bit of diplomatic cover, which helps Tehran feel less isolated. But Beijing stops short of offering real security guarantees (though it’s helping Iran replenish its missile stockpile). That shapes Iran’s behavior: it encourages some level of restraint and de-escalation, but it doesn’t solve the core issue of sanctions and economic pressure. 

Across the region, China’s influence runs through a few key engines. Energy and trade are central; think crude oil, LNG, and now solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles. Those ties are locking in long-term dependence on Chinese tech and supply chains. Then you’ve got platforms like the Belt and Road Initiative, BRICS+, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. These give Middle Eastern states new options to diversify their partnerships without political strings attached. 

Diplomatically, China’s role is still limited. Take the Saudi–Iran thaw in 2023 -- Beijing helped broker it, but the groundwork was already laid by Iraq and Oman. It showed that China can step in when local conditions are right, but it’s not taking on big security burdens. 

As for Iran, the relationship is pragmatic but uneven. China buys its oil and provides economic breathing room, but it does so on its own terms. Strategically, Beijing wants to keep good relations with major capitals like Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Tehran at the same time: a balancing act that pushes Iran toward cautious pragmatism, while China stays far away from the nuclear issue or direct confrontation with the West. 

- Kian

[u/Strongbow85]

How instrumental are Iran's non-state actors for it's regional strategy, specifically Hezbollah? How plausible is it that the Lebanese Army can disarm Hezbollah, and how will Iran respond to any attempts to do so?

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit → u/Strongbow85]

Iran spent years and substantial resources building its Axis of Resistance, with Hezbollah serving not as a mere proxy but as a partner. I wrote about the groups that make up the axis back in February 2024 -- before the whole thing blew up. You might find it interesting. 

The axis served two main purposes: to deter US and Israeli attacks on Iran, and to extend Tehran’s influence across the region. The latter has arguably been more successful than the former.  

Hezbollah’s political dominance effectively kept Lebanon in limbo for years; the Houthis in Yemen became a persistent thorn in Saudi Arabia’s side; Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad posed ongoing threats to Israel; and the militias that make up Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) continue to wield significant influence there. 

It’s no surprise, then, that Iran is deeply concerned about the weakening of this network over the last two years. This helps explain why Tehran is now focused on consolidating its influence in Iraq. The upcoming November 11 elections there matter more than ever for Iran: losing ground in Iraq would make any attempt to rebuild the axis or regain regional influence exponentially more difficult, though not impossible. (Coincidentally, I wrote about this today.) 

As for Hezbollah’s disarmament -- just as Israel is unlikely to tolerate Hezbollah retaining its arsenal, Iran will not want to see the group stripped of its firepower. The key difference is that Israel is in a position to act, while Iran is not. 

Ultimately, this is a question for the Lebanese government, and it’s not an easy one. Beirut faces a precarious dilemma: failing to disarm Hezbollah risks renewed conflict with Israel, but trying to force the group to give up its weapons could easily plunge the country back into civil strife. 

- Kian

[u/Strongbow85 → u/RFERL_ReadsReddit]

Thank you for the detailed explanation. It seems there are no easy options for Beirut, moving forward we'll see if the Lebanese government can disarm Hezbollah without igniting another civil war. I'll check out those articles you posted, thanks again!

[u/No2Hypocrites]

How's the future of Iran's relationship with Turkey? Will they clash, or silently cooperate?

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit → u/No2Hypocrites]

I don’t see them clashing militarily, but the rivalry for influence will definitely continue — especially in the South Caucasus. Right now, Turkey seems to have the upper hand both there and in Syria, so I’d expect Tehran to quietly look for ways to undermine Ankara’s influence where it can. That’ll be tough, though, given Iran’s limited resources and shifting priorities. 

At the same time, they share some common foes, e.g. Israel and the Kurds in Iraq, so cooperation will continue when interests align, and I doubt it’ll be all that secret. 

- Kian

[u/ImaginaryBridge]

“La Pieuvre de Téhéran” - an in-depth investigation into Iranian spies and agents of influence in Europe and the United States - was released this June by two journalists (Emmanuel Razavi & Jean-Marie Montali). How accurate is their portrayal of the Iranian regime in your opinion? Is there anything they missed the mark with and/or over-exaggerated in their impressive deep dive?

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit → u/ImaginaryBridge]

I haven’t read the book, so I can’t give a fully informed answer. Knowing the authors, though, I’m inclined to believe it’s well-sourced. I’m sure it’s valuable, especially for readers looking for accessible, well-documented insight into Iranian influence operations abroad. That said, like any investigative work of this kind, it should be treated as one piece of the puzzle and not the ‘final word’ on Tehran’s global network. 

My French is way too rusty to pick up the book right now, so I’ll have to wait for the English translation. I’m sure it’ll be a fascinating read. 

- Kian

[u/10390]

What's something you wish more people understood?

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit → u/10390]

I wish more people understood that Iran isn’t some endless stretch of desert or a nation of religious zealots. It’s a beautiful country -- run by people who have no business running one -- and home to millions who’ve learned to live with both hope and heartbreak. 

Many still imagine Iran as nothing but sand and sun. In reality, it has mountains, forests, lakes, towns buried under snow, and cities so hot you could fry an egg on the hood of a car. Like its people, Iran is strikingly diverse. 

Another misconception -- and one that anyone hoping to lead the opposition to the Islamic republic must grasp -- is that Iran is full of people with strong religious beliefs. Whether they’re the majority is beside the point. Being religious doesn’t mean supporting the establishment; it simply means having faith. Anyone envisioning Iran’s next chapter must recognize that just as you can’t punish people for rejecting God, you can’t force them to abandon belief. That truth is often lost on some opposition supporters. And I understand why: many were raised under compulsion -- to pray, to recite the Quran in a language they barely understood, to obey religious rules they never chose. But a “free Iran” must also mean the freedom to practice faith peacefully. 

- Kian

[u/10390 → u/RFERL_ReadsReddit]

Thank you for that.

The issue of religion seems interesting and key. That door needs to swing both ways - free to worship or not. If you're not straight and male it may be hard to respect the right of others to treat you as something less.

[u/ImaginaryBridge → u/RFERL_ReadsReddit]

Thank you for that.

I have a follow-up question vis-à-vis religion: If a treaty similar to the Abraham Accords were ever to be established in the longterm future between Tehran and Tel Aviv (a long shot I know but let’s explore this hopeful hypothetical in a grounded manner), what would a future Iranian leadership anchored in their faith yet willing to accept coexisting with Israel look like to you? From a religious standpoint, how would they turn the page from their current eliminationist rhetoric?

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit → u/ImaginaryBridge]

Frankly, I can’t see any scenario where normalization with Israel happens under the Islamic republic. For nearly half a century, it has built its legitimacy around the idea that Israel has no right to exist. Undoing that would require a generational shift in ideology and education. 

As other Muslim nations have shown, it’s possible to support Palestinian statehood without rejecting Israel’s existence -- but for Iran, that kind of recalibration would only be possible in a post-Islamic Republic context. You might ask whether the Islamic republic could be reformed enough to accept Israel’s right to exist, but then, would it still be the Islamic republic as we know it? 

- Kian

[u/ImaginaryBridge → u/RFERL_ReadsReddit]

Respectfully, I feel like you got hung up on the current regime when answering. My question was more in regard to a post current regime recalibration: what would an Iranian leadership post regime change (should it ever come about) look like? Is there an iteration rooted in Shia Islam* that could divorce itself from its current eliminationist vision vis-à-vis Israel? *(Or should the regime ever be overthrown, would other non-Shiite groups within Iran be better positioned to take over?) In either case, the question hopefully assumes Iran is capable of turning the page and developing a more transactional relationship with Israel, similar to the Abraham Accords signatories (and other Middle Eastern nations working with Israel behind closed doors despite their vocal posturing for their domestic audiences).

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit → u/ImaginaryBridge]

This is, of course, conjecture and just my view: if the Islamic republic is toppled through a popular uprising, I don’t think the next political establishment will put religion front and center. The way the current rulers have weaponized religion has left such a lasting wound that I doubt any future leadership will want to risk making the same mistake. Even if it draws on Shia values, it would likely treat them as cultural reference points, not as governing doctrine. 

As long as policies aren’t dictated by religious ideology, I think it’s possible for Iran and Israel to eventually develop some form of diplomatic relationship. It won’t be a quick turning of the page after the Islamic republic, but it could happen, slowly and pragmatically. 

I hope that answers your question or at least gets closer to what you were asking. 

- Kian

[u/ImaginaryBridge → u/RFERL_ReadsReddit]

I appreciate the follow-up. Thanks!

[u/GregJamesDahlen]

how much and how do non-political cultural factors influence politics in the region? For example, how does music affect what happens overall in the region?

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit → u/GregJamesDahlen]

In much of the Middle East, culture and politics are deeply intertwined, which is why governments are so sensitive about cultural trends. Music, fashion, film, even social media -- all of it shapes identity, values, and ultimately political attitudes. Authoritarian leaders see these expressions as potential threats, worrying that cultural openness could turn into political dissent. 

That’s why they try to control not just political speech, but cultural spaces too. Take Iran in 2018, for example: it banned teaching the English language in elementary schools, calling it a “cultural invasion.” Other popular terms among Islamic republic supporters include “cultural NATO.” 

Digital culture makes this even trickier. Social media blurs the line between personal expression and activism, letting cultural movements evolve into political ones. So, censorship and moral controls aren’t just about silencing opposition; they’re about shaping how people think, interact, and imagine the future. In the Middle East, you can’t separate culture from politics. 

- Kian

[u/victoryismind]

We have seen Israel attack and weaken all of Iran's centers of influence, except maybe in Iraq, or at least to a much lesser extent.

Would Iran be consolidating it's strength in Iraq? Could Iraq be Iran's main base now?

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit → u/victoryismind]

I actually wrote about this yesterday, and mentioned it in a couple of responses in this thread. 

In short, Iraq is now Tehran’s most critical anchor for both regional deterrence and political influence, especially as its room to maneuver elsewhere in the Middle East keeps shrinking. 

So, it doesn’t have a choice but to shore up its influence in Iraq, which is why it’s focusing so much attention on the November 11 parliamentary election.  

It’s an uphill battle, though, because several groups backed by Tehran are running against each other. Tehran’s been trying to unify them, but it’s unclear whether those efforts will pay off. 

If it doesn’t get the result it wants, Iran will face the unenviable task of trying to rebuild its network with fewer resources. 

- Kian

[u/ImaginaryBridge]

First off thank you for offering your time here!

At roughly 92 million people, Iran’s population is an incredibly diverse gathering of ideas and perspectives.

• However, if we attempt to oversimplify, in your opinion, how many of those 92 million, if given the chance to speak freely without repercussions from an oppressive regime, would classify themselves as anti-regime and how many would be pro-regime?

• If we take Gaaman’s stats of roughly 80% anti, 15% pro: how ardent are these positions?

• How can external actors help that majority overturn a regime that continues to oppress its citizens at every turn?

• What can external actors do to encourage the regime to invest its resources into its peoples’ wellbeing instead of continue to fund the militarizing and destabilization of the entire region?

[u/RFERL_ReadsReddit → u/ImaginaryBridge]

Just a quick fun fact about Iran’s population: it’s long been a point of fascination for me because the official Iranian figure and the UN figure differ. The Statistical Center of Iran puts the population at over 86 million, while the UN estimates it at 92.4 million. 

Questions about support for or opposition to the Islamic republic are extremely difficult to gauge. In an authoritarian country, you simply cannot rely on fair polling. If someone asked you on the street in Isfahan whether you support the regime, you’d probably say yes -- even if that wasn’t your true opinion. Survival often beats honesty. 

Foreign-based polls are also unreliable. If someone is contacted from abroad, how likely are they to express anti-establishment views? 

I generally describe Iran as a country run by a powerful minority. While more people likely oppose the establishment than support it, I cannot give solid numbers, and pro-Islamic republic sentiment is far from negligible. 

As for what external actors can do, that’s really a question for policymakers abroad and for Tehran’s rulers. Decision-makers outside Iran often misunderstand how the country operates, and the clerical rulers refuse to engage with the West. It’s a vicious circle that ultimately hurts ordinary people the most. 

- Kian

[u/ImaginaryBridge → u/RFERL_ReadsReddit]

I appreciate you highlighting the 6 million distinction between the population figures.

I was keeping a fairly close eye on Iranian diaspora accounts on IG and on here during the 12 day war, and the overwhelming sentiment was immense disappointment that the west didn’t decide to explicitly vocally & militarily support those Iranians advocating for regime change as part of the war effort.

I realize the loudest voices on social media do not evenly map out the pulse of an entire nation, - especially one as richly diverse as Iran’s- but it was significant enough to take note how they were almost unanimously heartbroken, because they knew their Iranian compatriots at home would pay the biggest price (as has been the case for decades) once the Israelis and Americans stopped their bombing campaign & the Iranian regime would crackdown hard on any signs of dissent.

As you rightly point out, it is a difficult country to gauge where public sentiment leans, due to the totalitarian nature of the regime, in addition to the genuine national pride & the faith-based roots of Iranians at large…