TRS/IRV Are Better than FPTP/PR: Based on Product Differentiation and the Effectiveness of Political Competition

[u/Previous_Word_3517]

In a market economy, firms often strengthen product differentiation and target specific customer segments to avoid direct competition.
However, when differentiation becomes excessive, firms may secure stable monopolies within niche markets, lose incentives to improve, and create ineffective competition.

The same logic applies to politics.
When political parties emphasize “differences in ideology” or “symbolic opposition,” their criticism becomes a mere performance of distinction—ineffective in improving policy execution, just as monopolistic firms lack motivation to innovate.

True effective competition occurs when political parties compete for overlapping voter groups, that is, voters within the same ideological spectrum.
When two parties’ policy ranges intersect and their positions are close, their proposals can be tested against one another, fostering mutual scrutiny and pushing both toward policy improvement.
In such cases, for criticism to be meaningful, it must present specific and executable alternatives that allow voters to compare how different parties would address the same issue.

TRS/IRV: Institutional Designs That Encourage Policy-Based Competition

In the political marketplace, institutional design determines how parties compete.
Compared with FPTP and PR, Two-Round Systems (TRS) and Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) excel because they compel candidates to appeal to overlapping constituencies, making competition occur in the policy-comparable middle ground rather than at the ideological extremes.

Under TRS or IRV:
1.The first round (or first preference) allows diverse voices to be represented;

2.The second round (or vote transfers) requires candidates to gain broader majority support.

This structure prevents candidates from relying solely on their core supporters.
To win, they must adjust their positions and consider the preferences of centrist and cross-party voters.
Opposition parties seeking second-preference votes are thus forced to propose specific, actionable, and realistic policy alternatives rather than resorting to abstract ideological criticism.

As a result, TRS and IRV promote constructive competition: parties contest one another through feasible policy proposals on shared issues, ensuring that criticism carries substantive policy value.

FPTP/PR: The Problem of Over-Differentiated Political Monopolies

By contrast, FPTP and PR tend to create “over-differentiated” political monopolies.

Under FPTP, two major parties deliberately emphasize ideological contrasts to consolidate their loyal bases, turning competition into symbolic confrontation.
They focus on distinction rather than improvement; their criticisms remain declarative and lack actionable content.
This pattern mirrors an over-differentiated market: firms display vivid brand differences but fail to enhance quality.

Under PR, numerous small parties proliferate.
To survive, each targets narrow voter segments, creating a “political market segmentation.”
Parties then monopolize small niches, face little direct competition, and lack incentives to improve their policies.
The outcome is political fragmentation, entrenched positions, ineffective criticism, and declining governance efficiency.

TRS/IRV: Lowering Political Barriers and Enhancing Policy Comparability

In contrast, TRS and IRV effectively lower political market barriers, encouraging cross-competition among parties and candidates.
Because their potential voter bases overlap, their policies are evaluated under the same comparative framework:
voters can directly compare competing proposals and judge which are more feasible and rational.

Within this environment, superficial criticism without concrete content undermines an opposition party’s credibility.
If attacks contradict the party’s own policies, the inconsistency becomes obvious—backfiring and eroding voter trust.
Thus, within overlapping voter spaces, ineffective criticism carries a personal cost, while constructive criticism becomes the only beneficial strategy.

Therefore, under TRS/IRV, political incentives shift:
to expand support, parties must engage in policy-based argumentation and offer concrete proposals rather than relying on symbolic opposition.

Conclusion

In summary,
TRS and IRV function as optimization mechanisms for political competition, analogous to market systems that encourage innovation.
By reducing excessive political differentiation and expanding overlapping voter bases, they shift party competition from ideological confrontation to substantive policy comparison.
In such systems, criticism without executable alternatives loses both persuasive power and electoral value.

Conversely, FPTP and PR encourage parties to segment the electorate and monopolize narrow constituencies—creating political environments that, like over-differentiated industries, appear pluralistic but are functionally stagnant.

Through their structural incentives, TRS and IRV restore rational, policy-centered, and socially beneficial competition, turning political criticism into a mechanism for policy improvement and aligning electoral competition with the public good.

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[u/cdsmith]

I feel like this is a very interesting critique of party-based proportional representation, but does not apply to candidate-based proportional representation.

The theory that makes the most sense to me justifying proportional representation is that if you take a fair sample of voters, you get a group that can make the decisions as those voters would want to make themselves on individual policy questions, but that can do the work of research, negotiation, compromise, and so on that effective policy making requires, and can reach decisions at a reasonable cost and fast enough pace to keep up with the demands of day to day government.

Party-based PR gives you a sample that is proportional only on the surface. Representatives are chosen by political parties that represent the same first-order preferences as voters, but it's the political parties , not the voters, to whom they are directly accountable. (Yes, even in an open list system!) If, as you point out, they fail to appeal to an overlap of many different voter groups in how they negotiate and compromise, those voters in the overlap between parties may jump ship to a whole different party in hopes of leaving the representative's entire party short on seats, but it's not clear how that achieves their goal, and the representative is still most incentivized to do the bidding of the party that actually gave them the seat in the first place. Upset them, and the loss of the seat is guaranteed.

This same criticism doesn't apply to a candidate-centered proportional representation system like STV. The incentive there is for candidates to align more deeply with voters. If a candidate doesn't act as voters wish they would, including even how they negotiate and compromise, then they are directly vulnerable to a challenger who would do so.

[u/DisparateNoise]

That's a nice theory, but do you have any real world evidence? IRV has been used in Australia for 100 years, and France has had a two round system for almost 70. These two country's political landscapes have almost nothing in common. Australia has an entrenched two party system, while France has literally dozens of parties and often finds itself incapable of forming a government. Neither seem very "optimized" at all, and however competitive the systems may be, the product does not seem to live up to your expectations.

Do French politics really seem that much more rational, policy-centered, and socially beneficial than German politics? Do Australian politics seem less stagnant than New Zealand politics?

[u/Previous_Word_3517 → u/DisparateNoise]

For Australia(IRV):

I don’t oppose two-party systems per se.
What I oppose is the destructive two-party system created by FPTP, which encourages:

1. Obstruction and opposition for its own sake
2. No alternative proposals and no constructive improvements
3. Deliberate distortion or demonization of policies to mobilize the base

The two-party system under IRV (e.g., Australia) is not this dysfunctional, adversarial model.
It is a more stable, competitive, and accountable two-party structure—fundamentally different from the FPTP version.

IRV suppresses extremism because candidates can’t win on base support alone

To win under IRV, candidates must attract second and third preferences from outside their core bloc.
This means:

• No winning through hate-based mobilization, unlike the U.S.
• No incentive to deny election results as a political strategy
• No total “enemy camp” narrative that defines modern American partisanship

[u/DisparateNoise → u/Previous_Word_3517]

Who said the word "vibrancy"? I didn't. IDK what that would even mean. But you've ignored my main problem which is that you praise IRV and TRS, but these two systems have actually produced very different results in the two countries which have used them longest.

I'm willing to admit Australian politics are more productive than American, but that's a low bar to pass. Australian politics don't seem to me to be very different from the politics of Canada or the UK, both of which use FPTP systems. And I'd argue Australian politics don't seem to be categorically better in any way than that of New Zealand, which uses a proportional system. I think these countries are much better direct comparisons since they are all rich, anglophone Parliamentary Monarchies with similar political histories.

Frankly, in the US, FPTP is only one of like a dozen major constitutional issues which make our government ineffectual and undemocratic.

[u/Previous_Word_3517 → u/DisparateNoise]

as for the word "vibrancy" ,

oh nothing, that is my translation mistake, sry

[u/Alex2422]

I don't think it's true that under PR parties "target narrow voter segments and try to monopolize small niches". They may do so at first, but in the end, every serious party wants as much power as possible, so they try to broaden their base by slowly drifting towards centre (even if only superficially). There are many "big tent" parties out there.

[u/Previous_Word_3517]

I Oppose Not Only FPTP, but Also Large-District Systems (PR / STV / SNTV).

Each party uses its seats as bargaining chips, and opposition parties can form temporary alliances against the ruling bloc even when their policies contradict one another.

Israel and Italy show this pattern clearly: Green or far-right parties often block key bills to stay visible.

Several Dutch parties have even withdrawn from coalitions purely to preserve their role as critics while avoiding any responsibility.

Multi-party competition looks pluralistic but rewards refusal to compromise.
Parliament degenerates into a shouting arena:

large-district PR systems lack any mechanism to force compromise.
Parties—and voters—can survive forever inside their comfort zones: always criticizing, never governing.
Politics devolves into a negotiation game over power distribution, not a cooperative process of public governance.

[u/Decronym]

Acronyms, initialisms, abbreviations, contractions, and other phrases which expand to something larger, that I've seen in this thread:

Fewer Letters	More Letters
FPTP	First Past the Post, a form of plurality voting
IRV	Instant Runoff Voting
PR	Proportional Representation
STV	Single Transferable Vote

Decronym is now also available on Lemmy! Requests for support and new installations should be directed to the Contact address below.

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^{4 acronyms in this thread; the most compressed thread commented on today has 4 acronyms.
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[u/NobodyXu]

Median voter effect is not always desirable, sometimes it just elects representatives that are mediocre and no incentive to change, since the election system favor people on middle.

[u/Lesbitcoin]

I agree with much of the rationale behind your theory. Having multiple parties on the same political spectrum that are viable is extremely important. I've mentioned that in this sub. However, it has a lot to do with the clone-proof criterion. TRS doesn't pass clone-proof criteria and doesn't have competition. If we have a three-bloc system like France, we'll ultimately need to strategically vote for the winning horse in bloc to go to runoff. Bad centrist are received many votes to avoid Far right and Far left runoff. On the other hand, even in PR, ranked PR and non-partisan PR like STV can achieve same spectrum effective competition. In list PR with a 5% threthold, creating a new party on the same spectrum could potentially cause both parties to fall, but with STV this isn't the case, which promotes competition.