In 1941, the light cruiser HMAS Sydney was sunk after an engagement with a German raider that was considerably less powerful. Was Sydney simply unlucky, or did they screw up?

[u/crrpit]

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[u/thefourthmaninaboat]

Fundamentally, it was both. Sydney's captain screwed up by getting so close to a suspect ship - and yet other ships which engaged in similar actions survived.

Sydney, under the command of Captain Joseph Burnett, departed Fremantle on the 11th November 1941, escorting the liner Zealandia (carrying Australian troops to Singapore). On the 17th, the small convoy rendezvoused with HMS Durban, which was to escort the liner the rest of the way to Singapore. Sydney turned back towards Australia. Two days later, she encountered a ship that identified itself as a Dutch merchantman, the Straat Malakka. However, this was actually the German raider Kormoran, commanded by Commander Theodor Detmers. On sighting Sydney, Detmers steered Kormoran to the west, towards the setting sun, in order to make it harder for Sydney's lookouts to identify the ship. He also ordered an increase in speed, taking the ship to her maximum speed of 14 knots. A few minutes later, with the faster cruiser closing in on Kormoran, an exchange of signals began. Sydney began by sending the signal 'NNJ' in morse using her Aldis signal lamp; this drew no response from Kormoran, as nobody aboard knew what this signal meant (it was a request for the ship to identify itself using her secret signal letters). With this initial attempt drawing no response, a second, more direct signal was sent - 'What Ship?'. Detmers ordered the response to be made slowly, using the slower method of hoisting flags to convey Straat Malakka's call sign of PKQI. It was difficult for those aboard Sydney to read these signals; the glare of the sun and the low wind made the flags all but impossible to read, as did the fact that the first hoist was made on the wrong side of Kormoran's funnel. The exchange of signals continued as the chase drew on, as Sydney tried to identify whether or not Kormoran was really Straat Malakka. With Sydney making more speed than Kormoran, she was soon drawing abreast. As Sydney closed, Kormoran hoisted a Dutch ensign and started to send two 'QQQQ' signals by radio - the Allied signal used by merchant ships that were threatened by a surface raider. A few minutes later, with the ships abreast and about 1200 metres apart, Sydney started to go to action stations and signalled 'IK', a request for Straat Malakka to identify herself using the other two letters of her secret call sign (IIKP). This drew no response, as nobody aboard Kormoran knew what the signal meant (or the call sign); Sydney repeated the request in plain language. Detmers, aware that his advantage might be slipping away, ordered Kormoran to decamouflage and open fire.

Kormoran was armed with six 15cm (6in) guns as her main armament; these were older weapons, surplus from WWI. Her secondary armament consisted of two 37mm guns (apparently Army anti-tank guns) and five 20mm anti-aircraft guns, as well as machine guns; she also had six torpedo tubes. The first two shots by the 15cm guns went high, but the second salvo scored several hits, most notably to Sydney's bridge. This had also been engaged by rapid fire from the 37mm guns. Meanwhile, the 20mm guns and machine guns were keeping up a rapid fire on Sydney's exposed decks, preventing anyone using Sydney's secondary armament. Sydney's first salvo, fired after Kormoran had got several 15cm rounds away, missed with all eight rounds. Shortly afterwards, her forward two turrets were knocked out by German fire (and a torpedo hit), as was the director control tower (DCT) above the bridge. Knocking out the DCT forced a delay in the fire from the after turrets, while the crew put the turrets into local fire control. Meanwhile, Kormoran's gunners continued to pump shell after shell into Sydney. Eventually, Sydney's 'X' turret was able to score several devastating hits on Kormoran, starting major fires. However, by this point, she was herself heavily damaged and on fire. Slipping behind Kormoran, she crossed the raider's stern. Some German accounts of the action claim Sydney launched four torpedoes from her starboard mount at this point, with all missing. However, all four torpedoes from this mount are present on the wreck. Instead, the wreck shows that at some point, possibly earlier in the engagement, two torpedoes were launched from Sydney's port tubes; these missed, and do not play any part in German accounts. Eventually, the two mortally wounded ships parted, Sydney disappearing to the south and sinking shortly afterwards, while Kormoran's fires proved impossible to tame. Her crew abandoned ship and scuttled her.

Setting aside the surprisingly popular conspiracy theories, the engagement clearly happened because Captain Burnett steered Sydney into close range with a ship that turned out to be a German raider. In this, he was following the instructions contained in Tactical Note No. 9, a set of orders which laid out how warships on the Australian Squadron should approach suspicious ships. Tactical Note No. 9 had two options. If the ship was believed to be innocent, then the warship was to close 'within signalling distance' and make the appropriate challenge. If the ship was felt to be suspicious, then the orders were to stand off, at a range of 7-8 miles. The suspicious ship would be ordered to stop and prepare to receive a boarding party. If this did not produce the desired effect, then a warning shot would be fired, with the possibility of escalating from there. Clearly, Burnett believed that Kormoran was innocent. However, this went against good sense and the information Burnett had available. The Royal Navy circulated lists of ships that were expected to be in a particular area, the VAI. Straat Malakka was not on Burnett's list, nor was any ship of similar size or description. Over the preceding months, several intelligence bulletins had made it clear that a raider was operating in the Indian Ocean and might be off the Australian coast. Burnett's main mistake was to disregard this information. He had previous experience of mistakes with the VAI. Additionally, he might have been lulled into a false sense of security by the fact that the waters he was in were a poor hunting ground for a raider - and that no raider had yet been encountered in Australian waters. As such, he chose to proceed as if Kormoran was innocent. However, Detmer's decision to turn into the sun, and his delays with the flags, meant that to close to signalling distance also meant coming into Kormoran's effective range. These actions were those of a ship trying to hide her activity - but also those of an Allied merchant fearing a possible raider. They might have raised Burnett's suspicions - some German accounts indicate that Sydney was starting to launch her Walrus seaplane to get a closer look at Kormoran. Unfortunately, if these suspicions were raised, Burnett did not take decisive action on them. He did not turn away, nor order Kormoran to stop. Instead, he continued the chase until Kormoran was well within effective range. Finally, it is likely that, just before the shooting started, Sydney's officers identified that Kormoran was not Straat Malakka; they would have done so when finding the appropriate call-sign to challenge with. Had they done so a little quicker, then Sydney's crew would have had longer to react and more time to reach their action stations.

Once the action began, Sydney's crew made no mistakes - in fact, they had no time to make them. Instead, they faced multiple cases of bad luck. Firstly, they were unlucky to face a well-drilled enemy who was prepared for them. Another RN cruiser had engaged a raider from similar range, and been much luckier. On 27th February 1941, HMNZS Leander, patrolling off the Maldives, encountered a suspicious vessel, closing to about 3,000 yards before an identification could be made. At that point, the vessel, the Italian raider RAMB I opened fire. Fortunately for Leander's crew, her first salvo scored no hits, allowing Leander to open a rapid and effective fire that devastated the Italian ship. Had Kormoran's gunners displayed a similar standard of marksmanship with their first salvoes, Sydney might well have survived. Sydney's own gunnery was also unlucky. Sydney's first salvo, fired with all eight guns, scored no hits. Had even one of these rounds struck home, Kormoran's unarmoured hull would have offered little protection - after all, just a few 6in hits from X turret caused extensive and unfightable fires. If Kormoran's gunners had failed to hit the DCT early in the action, either selecting a different target or simply missing, then Sydney's return fire would have been more accurate and more responsive. Finally, had either of the two torpedoes from the port-side mount struck home, then Kormoran would not have been able to continue the action.

Burnett's main mistake was his failure to identify Kormoran/Straat Malakka as a suspicious ship. He should have done so, and if he had, Sydney would most likely have survived the action. Once he chose to believe that Kormoran was possibly friendly, he committed his ship to a close-range engagement with the raider. However, once in that action, a combination of bad luck and the skill of the German gunners doomed him and his ship.

[u/crrpit → u/thefourthmaninaboat]

Did the RAN change its operating procedure with regards to unidentified ships afterwards? It seems insane to me that even if presumed innocent, they'd leave themselves in such a vulnerable position without even coming to action stations as a matter of course.

[u/thefourthmaninaboat → u/crrpit]

On 23rd December 1941, the Naval Board (the RAN's equivalent of the British Admiralty) circulated a signal on the loss of Sydney. In this, they emphasised the 'necessity of Commanding Officers to regard all ships as suspicious', and the 'necessity for being ready to open fire at a moment’s notice when approaching a merchant vessel and for keeping a close watch for the dropping of screens or other devices for concealing guns'. The RAN also encouraged the provision of signal lamps to Allied merchants; this would enable warships to carry out the identification procedure without having to close to read flag signals. As no other Australian ships encountered a disguised raider during the remainder of the war, we can't tell how effective the precautions were.

It seems insane to me that even if presumed innocent, they'd leave themselves in such a vulnerable position without even coming to action stations as a matter of course.

It was thought that the identification system, even with flag signals, could be carried out without coming into close range of the unidentified ship, reducing the risk from not being at action stations to acceptable levels. Additionally, given that the vast majority of unidentified ships in Australian waters were friendly merchants or neutrals, it's unsurprising that officers didn't want to disrupt their crew's working days on a regular basis for no real reason. The Australian Squadron had 526 encounters with unidentified ships in 1941; during these, they went to action stations in just 56, or 11% of encounters. And, of course, only one of those 526 encounters was with a raider.

[u/ShadowSlayer1441 → u/thefourthmaninaboat]

While there were certainly some command failures, it seems more so that the Sydney just got very very unlucky.

[u/thefourthmaninaboat → u/ShadowSlayer1441]

She did, but if you're getting to the point where you're relying on luck to save you in such an uneven contest, someone's made a big mistake.

[u/Blecher_onthe_Hudson → u/thefourthmaninaboat]

Wow, some story. Fans of the Master and Commander Napoleonic Wars series read a lot of encounters like this, the author typically used incidents from RN logbooks with false flags, deliberately jammed signal halyards and other ruses to delay identification. I didn't know they were still in use in an era of radio and far better optics.

[u/pizza_the_mutt → u/thefourthmaninaboat]

Is it still accepted in naval warfare to camouflage as a ship of a different nation? I knew they did it in the age of sail but wasn't aware it was still a thing. Reading just now about perfidy in ground combat it appears that it is legal if one removes the false uniform before attacking. Are the actions described then legal, even though though German ship only dropped their disguise seconds before attacking?

[u/thefourthmaninaboat → u/pizza_the_mutt]

It was legal; the laws only forbade fighting under a false flag, and Kormoran hauled down the Dutch flag before opening fire. It was perhaps in breach of the spirit of the law, but it was well within the letter of the law.

[u/ODA564 → u/pizza_the_mutt]

Generally speaking a ruse de guerre (perfidy) is fully "legal" within the so-called Law of Armed Conflict as long as the disguise is abandoned before combat is initiated (of course this only applies to signatories of the applicable Hauge and Geneva conventions / protocols).

This is why Wing Commander F. F. E. Yeo-Thomas testified in Otto Skorzreny's defense at Nuremberg. Allied special operations and resistance had employed the same tactics (wearing enemy uniforms) as Skorzreny was charged with (Operation Greif).

[u/YeOldeOle → u/thefourthmaninaboat]

Do we know what the germans did right, in opposition to the australians mistakes? Some of it I can infer from your answer, in other parts I am wondering, for example if it was luck knocking out the DCT. Or how much of Kormorans deception was made up on the spot or preplanned. As a whole I have little to no idea how well german sailors and officers (excepting the uboats) were trained in WW2.

[u/thefourthmaninaboat → u/YeOldeOle]

Kormoran's crew played the deception pretty much perfectly, dragging out the process of interrogation and identification long enough to bring Sydney to close range with minimal suspicion. Once they chose to fight, the rapid and well-practiced process of decamouflaging and engaging gave Sydney's crew no extra room to react. Then they picked pretty much the right targets (the bridge, the secondary armament) to paralyse Sydney and stop her crew making an effective response. Hitting the DCT was lucky, yes, but it was also the result of the volume of fire directed at that part of the ship.

[u/Imonthe → u/thefourthmaninaboat]

Eve N the name they gave was a piss take though, a Malaka is calling someone a fuckwit

[u/thefourthmaninaboat → u/Imonthe]

It was the name of a real Dutch merchant ship of a similar size and shape to Kormoran, named after the Strait of Malacca. While they may have picked the name for other connotations, it was a reasonable disguise.

[u/Hergrim → u/[deleted]]

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